Access to justice requires a fair examination of an indigent person's capacity to pay court fees, emphasizing immediate convertibility of assets.

1Applicants in Indigent Original Petition No. 35 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tirur are the appellants. They are legal heirs of one Marakkar and the suit is laid against the Kerala State Electricity Board for realisation of a sum of Rs. 2,29,360/- as compensation due to the death of the said Marakkar by electric shock. The first appellant is the wife and appellants 2 to 8 are the children of the deceased Marakkar. Appellants filed Indigent O.P. 35 of 1991 before the court below for permission to sue as indigents alleging that they have no sufficient means to pay the Court fee of Rs. 15,130/-. However, the Court below by the impugned order dismissed the application holding that the appellants have sufficient means to pay the court fee and they are not indigent persons. Hence, this CMA

2The question that arises for consideration is whether the appellants are possessed of sufficient means to pay the Court fee. No doubt, the report of the Government will show that an extent of 74 1/2 cents of land stood in the name of the late Marakkar, the predecessor of the appellants. But then, the appellants have a case that 42 1/2 of land in Survey Nos. 50/10, 20/1 and 50/9 are "Oru Pooval" nilam in the possession of the brother of the deceased Marakkar, who was examined as PW. 2 and after deducting that extent, they are actually in possession of only 32 cents of land. The appellants have a further case that the plaint schedule property is the property where their residential house is situated and it belonged in coownership to 8 persons including two minors being the wife and children of the deceased and all the 8 persons require residential house to be constructed over the land. If residential houses for 8 persons are constructed over the 32 cents of land, no portion of the property will be available for sale for raising the amount for payment of court fee. However, this contention did not find favour with by the learned Sub-Judge who held that if the appellants transferred six cents of land out of the land possessed by them, they could raise the amount necessary for payment of court fee. According to the learned Sub Judge, the appellants are also not entitled to exemption under clause (c) of S.60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure since the exemption under that provision applies only to residential building and site appurtenant thereto and it does not exclude the property where a building could be constructed in future. In short, according to the learned Sub Judge, the appellants are liable to raise the amount for payment of court fee by selling six cents of land from plaint A schedule property. We do not think that the reasoning of the court below is either sound or pragmatic. The question to be considered is not mere possession of property by the appellants, but sufficient means, that is the capacity to raise money to pay court fee and it is incumbent upon the court to come to a finding on that point. The capacity to raise money is the crux of the matter and this turns on immediate convertability of the property into cash (Krishna Iyer, J. in Janakykutty v. Varghese (1969 KLT 953)). Viewing the matter from a practical stand-point, it has to be held that an indigent person need not be bereft of all material possessions. The C.P.C. confers the benefit on persons without" sufficient means". It refers not to a person without any means. On the other hand, the expression used is "sufficient means" which is, means sufficient to pay court fee after meeting the basic needs of life. (Xavier v. Kuriakose (1987 (1) KLT 176)). The possession of "sufficient means" in O.33 R.1 CPC means possession of sufficient realisable property within the immediate reach of the plaintiff(s) which can be immediately converted into cash. Debts due to be realised or assets not within the immediate reach of the plaintiff(s) to be converted into cash cannot therefore, be taken into consideration for calculating sufficient means. (Prabhakaran Nair v. Neelaka