The representation of a collective interest in litigation ensures binding effects of decrees on all associated parties, irrespective of individual naming in the suit.

1 C. R. P. No. 57 of 1994 is filed by the judgment debtors 2 and 3 while C. R. P. No. 438 of 1994 is filed by some of the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder, the challenge in both the revisions being against the order in E. P. No. 95 of 1991 in O. S. No. 182 of 1977, on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Punalur.

2 The suit was filed by one Maria Nadanial for declaration of title and possession over the plaint schedule property and for consequential injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of, and enjoyment of the property by, the plaintiff or from trespassing upon the property or destroying its boundaries or committing any waste therein. The Trial Court decreed the suit declaring the plaintiff's possession over the plaint schedule property. A decree for injunction was also granted as prayed for. However, the prayer for declaration of title was not granted by the Trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff was not the absolute owner of the property and that there are other persons having coownership rights. The defendants challenged the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in appeal and Second Appeal unsuccessfully.

3 The legal representatives of the decree holder filed E. P. No. 95 of 1991 to execute the decree. The reliefs prayed for in the execution petition include the arrest and detention of defendants 2 and 3, to compel them to obey the decree, and to detain them in civil prison till they obey the decree. There is also a prayer to remove defendants 2 and 3 from the decree schedule property and to attach the properties of defendants 2 and 3 in order to compel them to obey the degree; and to sell the said properties, in case they fail to obey the decree.

4 The judgment debtors contended that the execution petition is not maintainable. It was also contended that an earlier execution petition, namely, E. P. No. 4 of 1986, was dismissed on the merits and also on the ground that all the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder were not impleaded. Therefore, the present execution petition is not maintainable. The description of the decree schedule property is incorrect. The decree holders have no manner of right over the decree schedule property. The second judgment debtor is residing in the property for the last several years and she has effected improvements worth Rs.50,000/- in the property.

5 The executing court rejected the contentions raised by the judgment debtors and directed removal of judgment debtors 2 and 3 from the property, who refused to vacate the decree schedule property. The prayer for detaining the judgment debtors in civil prison was not allowed by the executing court, which is the subject of challenge in C. R. P. No. 438 of 1994, by some of the legal representatives of the decree holder.

6 Sri. K. C. John, Senior Advocate, appearing for the judgment debtors contended that the decree is inexecutable against the revision petitioners in C. R. P. No. 57 of 1994. It is contended that the property belongs to C.S.I. Church. The Church was not made a party to the suit and no decree was passed against the Church. The C.S.I. Trust Association is the owner of the properties and only the trustees can represent the Church. The trustees were not made parties to the suit and, therefore, the decree cannot be executed in respect of the properties belonging to the Church. It was also contended by Sri. K. C. John, Senior Advocate, that in view of the dismissal of E. P. No. 4 of 1986, the present execution petition is barred by res judicata.

7 Sri. Subash Cyriac, learned counsel appearing for the decree holders, contended that the Church is bound by the decree as the Church was represented by its Vicar and Bishop in the suit. He contended that E. P. No. 4 of 1986 was dismissed on the ground that all the legal representatives of the deceased decree holder were not impleaded and on the ground that no evidence was adduced. The order in E. P. No. 4 of 1986 was not o