An authority must adhere to mandatory statutory provisions when superseding a committee, failing which the order is deemed illegal.

1. The petitioners, nine in number, were the elected members of the Managing Committee of the Quilon Automobile Employees Co - operative Society, having been elected on 20/06/2010. As they had been at the helm of the affairs of the Society, the first respondent issued Ext. P1 show cause notice purportedly under S.32 of the Kerala Co - operative Societies Act, 1969 (‘the Act’ for brevity) seeking explanation from the petitioners, the members of the Managing Committee, why the Managing Committee comprising them should not be superseded. Though the petitioners did submit their explanation through Ext. P2, the first respondent eventually passed Ext. P3 order dated 28/02/2015 superseding the Managing Committee and also appointing a Part - time Administrator. Assailing Ext. P3, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition.

2. Sri. P. C. Sasidharan, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that Ext. P3 is devoid of any reasoning, much less merit. In elaboration of his submissions, the learned counsel has laid specific emphasis on S.32 of the Act, especially sub-sections (2) and (3) thereof.

3. Taking me through the statutory provisions, the learned counsel has submitted that in terms of sub-section (2) of S.32, the first respondent ought to have consulted the financing bank and the Circle Co - operative Union before passing Ext. P3 order. He has further contended that, if the first respondent, in any event, had come to an objective conclusion that consultation was not practicable, he ought to have, in terms of sub-section (3) of S.32, recorded cogent reasons in that regard.

4. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that under whatever excuse, including the alleged gravity of the allegations levelled against the members of the Managing Committee, the first respondent could not have given a go - bye to the mandatory statutory provisions and rendered a grossly illegal order. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on State of Kerala v. Urukunnu Service Co - operative Bank Ltd., 2013 (2) KHC 201 : 2013 (2) KLT 733 (SC) : 2013 (2) KLT 74 : 2013 (2) KLJ 128 : ILR 2013 (2) Ker. 430] and State of M. P. v. Sanjay Nagayach, 2013 KHC 4422 : AIR 2013 SC 1921 : 2013 (7) SCC 25 : 2013 (178) Comp Cas 502.

5. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader representing the first respondent, at the outset, in my view fairly, conceded that the first respondent did not, as a pre - condition, consult the financing bank and the Circle Co - operative Union in terms of sub-section (2) of S.32 of the Act. He has also submitted that there is no specific finding in Ext. P3 that there is compliance with sub-section (3) of S.32 of the Act.

6. The learned Special Government Pleader has, however, submitted that the petitioners had an efficacious alternative remedy under S.83(1)(j) of the Act. Without recourse to the said statutory provisions, the petitioners, contends the learned Government Pleader, ought not to have rushed to this Court on the mere premise that Ext. P3 is grossly illegal. According to him, the Appellate Authority, the Government, is well equipped to deal with the issue that has arisen under Ext. P3. It is, according to him, competent even to suspend the operation of the impugned order pending further adjudication.

7. In support of his submission that in the face of an efficacious alternative remedy no writ petition is maintainable under Art.226 of the Constitution, the learned Government Pleader has placed reliance on Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2003 KHC 37