Delay in seeking relief does not preclude fundamental rights claims, emphasizing the need for equitable judicial intervention in employment termination cases.

1. Very often, when writ petitions are filed unreasonably long after the proximate cause for such action had arisen, Courts are placed in a predicament either to deny relief on grounds of laches, the claims having become stale or to assess the relief sought, from the touchstone of the violations complained of and to grant relief ex aequo et bono (from equity and good conscience).

2. Recourse in such situations is usually taken by the respondents to the off quoted maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subueniunt which, as is well known, declares that law comes to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy. This is to mean that only persons who are watchful and careful of using his / her rights, are entitled to the benefits of law, thus disentitling a petitioner to relief when petitions are filed unusually long after the cause of action arose.

3. However, in the assessment of these issues there is need for great caution because, as is now settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments, when it comes to violations of fundamental rights, especially to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself would not disentitle relief to a petitioner, but with a covenant that if, on account of such delay, rights have accrued to others, such rights cannot be disturbed unless the delay is explained with reasonable and sufficient cause.

4. These appeals call upon us to consider issues of laches and delay because the writ petitions, from which they arise, have been filed more than thirteen years after the cause of action had arisen. The appellants who are respondents in the writ petitions, contend inter alia that the writ petitions be dismissed on the short ground of delay asserting that the claims of the writ petitioners have become stale.

5. These appeals are listed before us for admission and we are proceeding to finally decide these at this stage itself with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. For ease of convenience, we will treat W.A. No. 1570 of 2017 as the lead case and reference to parties and documents in this judgment as they are arranged and marked in the said appeal.

6. We have heard Sri. Vipin P. Varghese, the learned standing counsel appearing for the appellant in all the three appeals; Sri. K. N. Sasidharan Nair, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 5 in W.A. No. 1570 of 2017, respondents 1 and 2 in W.A. No. 1784 of 2017 and the first respondent in W.A. No. 1584 of 2017 and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State of Kerala in all these cases. Although a certain Sri. A. K. Sree Kumar, proprietor of Jayasree Cashew Company, has been shown as a respondent in all these appeals, we deem it not necessary to issue notice to him because of the manner in which we intend to dispose of these appeals.

7. These appeals arise from three writ petitions which were filed by respondents 1 to 5 in W.A. No. 1570 of 2017, respondents 1 and 2 in W.A. No. 1784 of 2017 and the first respondent in W.A. No. 1584 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "the writ petitioners" for convenience). The writ petitioners claim that they were regular employees of the Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation" for short). Their grievance is that they were unceremoniously terminated from service by the Corporation for the reason that the cashew factories in which they were then employed were, by virtue of a judgment of this Court, released to the owners and, therefore, left without employment. They say that they had made certain representations before the Corporation against such termination but they concede that they had not approache