The presumption of innocence and conditions for anticipatory bail are critical, necessitating careful examination of charges and investigations.

O R D E R

This is an application filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ( BNSS ), 2023.

2. The petitioner is the accused in Crime No.810/2025 of Melparamba Police Station, Kasargod District. The offence alleged against the petitioner is punishable under Section 318 (4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

3. The prosecution case, as narrated in Annexure A2 order, reads thus:

“On 14.02.2025, the petitioner with an intention to deceit the defacto complainant, obtained an amount of Rs.3,50,000/- from the petitioner by offering a job of delivery boy at Georgia and even though the petitioner had spent 90 days in the said place in visiting visa, no job has been arranged by him, and no money was also returned.” [Sic.]

4. The case of the petitioner is that he has no connection with the offence alleged. The transfer of money to the account of the petitioner relates to a different transaction. It is the specific case of the petitioner that he had not offered visa to the defacto complainant as alleged. The petitioner is prepared to co-operate with the investigation.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent of the offence alleged against him.

7. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the bail plea of the petitioner.

8. While considering the scope of jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C., the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. v. State of Punjab [(1980) 2 SCC 565] held thus:

“31. In regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. On the other hand, if it appears likely, considering the antecedents of the applicant, that taking advantage of the order of anticipatory bail he will flee from justice, such an order would not be made. But the converse of these propositions is not necessarily true. That is to say, it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides; and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond. There are several other considerations, too numerous to enumerate, the combined effect of which must weigh with the court while granting or rejecting anticipatory bail. The nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and “the larger interests of the public or the State” are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail. The relevance of these considerations was pointed out in State v. Captain Jagjit Singh [AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962) 3 SCR 622 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 216] , which, though, was a case under the old Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code. It is of paramount consideration to remember that the freedom of the individual is as necessary for the survival of the society as it is for the egoistic purposes of the individual. A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may think fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall b