Consent in relationships must be scrutinized for coercion or misconception, distinguishing consensual acts from rape.

O R D E R

(Dated this the 11^th day of December, 2025)

The petitioner is the sole accused in Crime No.806 of 2023 of Aluva East Police Station, pending as S.C No.608 of 2025 before the Additional District and Sessions Court-POCSO, Ernakulam. The offence alleged against the petitioner is under Sections 376 (2)(n) of IPC .

2. The prosecution case is that the accused, who belongs to Bihar State, came in contact with the de facto complainant via Instagram, took her to a lodge at Aluva and then at Ernakulam and committed rape upon her repeatedly during the period from 12.2.2023 to 17.4.2023 and thereby he is alleged to have committed the aforesaid offences.

3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, even if the allegations levelled against the petitioner are believed as such, the same will not constitute the offence under Section 376 IPC , as the relationship between them was only a consensual one. Therefore, he prayed for quashing all further proceedings against the petitioner.

4. The petition was opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. On a perusal of the FI statement, it can be seen that, though in the FI statement, it is alleged that the first relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant was a forceful one, it appears that thereafter, on several occasions, she accompanied the petitioner to different lodges and permitted the petitioner to have sexual intercourse with her. The above conduct of the de facto complainant prima facie reveals that the relationship between them was a consensual one. It appears that, thereafter, the relationship between them broke up, which resulted in filing the present case against the petitioner.

6. In the decision in Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi , (2025) 5 SCC 764 , referring to two earlier decisions, the Apex Court held in paragraph 23 that :

“Recently this Court in XXXX vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 3 SCC 496 held that when the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape were not made out. Similarly, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 arising out of identical facts, this Court has enumerated the following:

“18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.”

7. In the decision in Mahesh Damu Khare v. The State of Maharashtra and Another, (2024) 11 SCC 398, in paragraph 27 & 28 the Apex Court held that :

“27. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman may have reasons to have physical relationship other than the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal marital ties.

28.Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely becaus