The court affirmed the validity of externment orders under the KAA(P) Act, emphasizing the necessity of thorough reasoning for maximum durations.

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment dated 01.07.2025 passed against the petitioner under Section 15 (1)(a) r/w 15(5) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District for a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order.

2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities that the District Police Chief, Thrissur City, on 05.06.2025 submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15 (1)(a) r/w 15(5) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. For initiation of the said proceedings, the petitioner was classified as a “known rowdy” as defined under Section 2 (p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.

3. The authority considered six cases in which the petitioner got involved for passing the order of externment. Out of the said cases, the case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.1369/2024 of Ollur Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 2 96(b), 324(4), 308(2) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “ BNS ”).

4. Heard Sri. Sarath Babu Kottakkal, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, Ext.P1 order was passed in a casual manner, and it was without assigning any reason that the jurisdictional authority passed the externment order for a maximum period of one year. The learned counsel submitted that when the maximum period of externment was ordered, it was incumbent upon the authority to show the reasons for the same. Nevertheless, no convincing reason whatsoever has been assigned by the authority for passing the maximum period of externment. The learned counsel further urged that there is an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the externment order, and the said delay would certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order of externment is liable to be set aside.

6. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the externment order was passed by the competent jurisdictional authority after due application of mind and upon recording the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. It was contended that there is no illegality in directing externment for a period of one year where the circumstances so warrant. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that an earlier externment order had been passed against the petitioner; however, the same failed to yield any positive result, as the petitioner subsequently again engaged in criminal activities. It was for this reason that the maximum permissible period of externment was imposed under the impugned order. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that there was neither any unreasonable delay in initiating the proposal nor in passing the externment order, as alleged by the petitioner, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is called for.

7. A perusal of the records reveals that it was after considering the recurrent involvemen