The revisional jurisdiction cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction; it preserves criminal jurisprudence and emphasizes compensatory over punitive aspects.

ORDER This revision petition is preferred impugning the judgment of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Thiruvananthapuram, in Criminal Appeal No.347/2009 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, ‘the Act’). The above appeal was preferred, challenging the judgment in S.T.No. 34 of 2005 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Neyyattinkara, whereby the accused was found guilty.

2. The trial court sentenced the revision petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 60,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

3. The appellate court, as per the impugned judgment, modified the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay compensation of Rs.62,000/- and in default of payment of compensation to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated the contentions which were raised before the courts below and got rejected concurrently. The contentions raised before me are also urging for re-appreciation of evidence, which is not permissible under the revisional jurisdiction unless any kind of perversity is found in the appreciation of evidence. 5. It is well settled that the revisional court cannot act as an appellate court and the power of the revisional court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [ (1999) 2 SCC 452 = 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus:

“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”

6. In Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [ (2015) 3 SCC 123 = (2015) 2 SCC (Cri)

19], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus:

“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is