The Internal Complaints Committee lacks jurisdiction under the Sexual Harassment Act when allegations do not qualify as sexual harassment within its definition.

JUDGMENT

Dated this the 30^th day of January, 2026 The petitioner states that he is a Higher Secondary School Assistant in Ariyallur Madhavanandha Vilasam Higher Secondary School, Ariyallur, Malappuram. The petitioner is under suspension and is challenging Exts.P4 and P4(a) enquiry reports dated 17.11.2025 of the Internal Complaints Committee constituted under the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal)

Act, 2013.

2. The enquiry leading to Exts.P4 and P4(a) was initiated on the basis of a WhatsApp message allegedly posted by the petitioner in the WhatsApp group exclusively for mail staff members of the said School. The petitioner did not share the alleged WhatsApp message to the aggrieved women. The very assumption of jurisdiction by the ICC is illegal, as the allegations do not constitute “sexual harassment at workplace” within the meaning of Sections 2 (a), 2(n) and 2(o) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act , 2013.

3. The enquiry conducted by the ICC is vitiated by gross violations of Section 11 of the Act, 2013, Rule 7 of the Rules, 2013, Rules 75 and 76 of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 and the relevant paragraphs of the Manual for Disciplinary Proceedings and the principles of natural justice. No charge memo was framed, no documents were furnished, the alleged voice message was never produced or played in the presence of the petitioner, no witnesses were examined in his presence, opportunity for cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and opportunity for defence evidence were not afforded.

4. Based solely on the said unsustainable reports, the petitioner was placed under suspension and subjected to disciplinary proceedings, while criminal proceedings arising out of the very same allegations are pending, in which the petitioner has already been granted bail. In view of the patent lack of jurisdiction, procedural illegality, violation of natural justice and binding precedents of this Court, the petitioner seeks interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the ICC reports and all consequential proceedings.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader representing the 1^st respondent. Notice to respondents 2 to 6 is dispensed with in view of the nature of the relief to be granted in this writ petition.

6. The argument of the petitioner is that the Internal Complaint Committee lacks jurisdiction to entertain Exts.P1 and P1(a) complaints, as the allegations do not disclose “sexual harassment at workplace” as defined under the Act, 2013. The alleged voice message was neither communicated by the petitioner to the complainants nor was it made at a workplace during the course of employment. Therefore, Exts.P1, P1(a), P4 and P4(a) are liable to be quashed.

7. I find that aggrieved by Exts.P4 and P4(a)

enquiry reports, the petitioner has now preferred Exts.P9 and P9(a) appeals before the District Educational Officer invoking Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act , 2013. As the petitioner has preferred statutory appeals, the appellate authority can consider the same and take appropriate decision thereon in accordance with law.

The writ petition is therefore disposed of directing the

1^st respondent to consider Exts.P9 and P9(a) appeals and take appropriate decision thereon within a period of six weeks after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Sd/-