A delay in detaining individuals under preventive laws can invalidate such orders if they sever the connection between the last offense and the detention necessity.

J U D G M E N T

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 19.12.2025, passed against one Hariram, the detenu, underSection 3(1) of theKerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu.

2. The records reveal that on 22.11.2025, after considering the detenu’s recurrent involvement in criminal activities, the District Police Chief, Palakkad, submitted a proposal seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3 (1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, namely, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda’ as defined under Section 2 (o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, three cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P2 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.671/2025 of Meenakshipuram Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act and 77 of the Juvenile Justice Act .

4. We heard Sri. Akhil Binoy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P2 order was passed without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned counsel urged that an application seeking cancellation of bail was already pending and, therefore, there was no necessity to invoke the provisions of the KAA(P) Act in haste, as cancellation of bail itself would have been an effective remedy to prevent the detenu from repeating criminal activities. The learned counsel also contended that there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, and the said delay would certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. On these premises, it was argued that Ext.P2 detention order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the order of detention was passed after complying with all the necessary legal formalities and after proper application of mind. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the mere pendency of a bail cancellation application does not preclude the detaining authority from passing a detention order, as cancellation of bail is not always an effective remedy to curb the criminal activities of habitual offenders. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, further asserted that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing Ext.P2 detention order after the commission of the last prejudicial activity. However, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing a detention order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order, and hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order.

7. One of the contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, though in the detention order it is mentioned that an application has been submitted for cancellation of bail granted to the detenu in one of the cases registered against him, the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P2 order without considering the said fact properly. According to the counsel, as an alternative remedy, cancellat