Detention orders must show a clear risk of reoffending upon release, particularly when the individual is already in custody.

Jobin Sebastian, J.

This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated

06.08.2025, passed against one Munafis K. P.,(herein after referred to as ‘detenu), under Section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act , 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 16.10.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of one year with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that, on 09.04.2025, a proposal was submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3 (1) of the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. Altogether, four cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No. 213/2025 of Nadakkavu Police Station, alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 22 (b) of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. P. Mohamed Sabah, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned counsel, there is an inordinate delay in passing the detention order, and the said delay would certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. Moreover, it was submitted that at the time of passing the detention order, although the jurisdictional authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with another case, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider the possibility of the detenu getting bail in that case. According to the learned counsel, since the detenu was already under judicial custody, it was incumbent upon the jurisdictional authority to consider whether there existed a real likelihood of the detenu being released on bail and, if released, whether he would again indulge in criminal activities. It was contended that a detention order can be legally sustained only if the authority is satisfied that there is a real possibility of the detenu being granted bail and that, upon such release, he is likely to engage in further criminal activities. On these premises, it was argued that the detention order is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that there is no unreasonable delay either in submitting the proposal or in passing the Ext.P1 detention order after the commission of the last prejudicial activity. However, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing a detention order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the detaining authority passed Ext.P1 order after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order.

6. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have perused the records.

7. As already stated, the case registered a