The court reinstated an ad interim injunction, determining that prima facie possession was established by the petitioners despite disputes over the validity of an agreement.

J U D G M E N T

The original petition is filed challenging Ext.P8 order passed in CMA No. 75 of 2024 by which the ad interim injunction granted by the Trial Court was vacated and confined to an order restraining the respondent/defendant from alienating the plaint schedule properties.

2. The petitioner instituted the suit for a specific performance contending that Ext.A1 agreement was superseded by Ext.A2 agreement and that in pursuance to the agreement they were put in possession of the property and that they were cultivating the land with paddy. Ext.A8 was produced along with suit to prove the case of possession and that they were having a registration with the Supply-Co for the purpose of proving that paddy was being supplied by the plaintiffs. Yet another document which was produced is a letter dated 09.11.2022 (Ext.A9) which is a copy of the complaint filed by the respondent before the police against the petitioners, wherein he has admitted the entrustment of the property to the plaintiffs for cultivation. The interlocutory application for injunction was resisted by the defendant by producing an agreement dated 09.11.2022 entered between him and one Siddique, a third party. The Trial Court on the material evidence, concluded the prima facie the petitioners/plaintiffs are holding possession over the plaint schedule property, and therefore, passed an ad interim injunction restraining the defendant and his men from obstructing the possession of the property committing any wastage. Though the respondent disputed the execution of Ext.A2 agreement, the Trial Court opined that the issue has to be decided finally in the suit. Accordingly, the I.A. was allowed. Aggrieved the defendant preferred CMA No. 75 of 2024, the 1^st Appellate Court found that in as much as the plaintiffs were granted only a permission to continue with the paddy cultivation and that they were only licensee’s and that since the licence has been withdrawn, they have no right to remain in possession of the property and therefore, vacated the order of injunction with regard to the possession of the plaintiffs and confined the injunction to restrain the respondent from alienating the plaint schedule property pending the suit against the original petitioners/plaintiffs.

3. Heard Sri. R.Ramadas, the learned Counsel for the petitioners and Smt. A Grancy Jose, the learned Counsel for the respondent.

4. Both parties seriously dispute regarding the findings rendered by the courts below as to who is in possession of the property. While considering the application for injunction, the respective merits of the contentions of the parties need not be gone in, but then, if the plaintiffs have established a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience is in their favour, necessarily they are entitled for an injunction. Keeping in mind these aspects, when this Court proceed to consider the findings rendered by the 1^st Appellate Court, it cannot but notice that the 1^st Appellate Court committed a complete remiss in appreciating the findings rendered by the Trial Court.

5. Though the learned Counsel for the respondent seriously disputed Ext.A2 agreement of the sale, this Court is of the view that the said contention cannot be gone into at present. Further, it is the case of the respondent that in order to claim benefit of Section 53A of the Transfer of property Act, Ext.A2 agreement must be a registered one. Though there cannot be any dispute with regard to the aforesaid preposition of law, one cannot remain oblivious of the fact that reading of Ext.A9 shows that there is a clear admission by the respondent as regards the possession of the plaint schedule proper