Eligibility for Input Tax Credit is affirmed under Section 16(5) despite delays, when statutory provisions are applied retrospectively.

JUDGMENT

The petitioner is a registered taxpayer under the provisions of the CGST Act/KSGST Act , 2017. The grievance of the petitioner is against Exts.P1 and P2 orders passed under Section 73 of the CGST/KSGST Act, rejecting the Input Tax Credit claimed by the petitioner pertaining to the period for the months of February and March 2018 as per Ext.P1 and for the period from November 2018 to March 2019 as per Ext.P2. The claim of the petitioner is based on Section 16(5) of the CGST Act, which provides that, in case the taxpayer is submitting the returns within the cut-off date contemplated therein i.e. 30.11.2021, such taxpayer would be entitled to claim the Input Tax Credit.

2. On perusal of Ext.P1 order, it can be seen that the petitioner submitted the returns for the months of February 2018 and March 2018 on 02.12.2019, and as per Ext.P2, the petitioner had submitted the returns pertaining to the period from November 2018 to March 2019 on 03.12.2019 and 04.12.2019. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner had fulfilled the requirement of Section 16(5) of the Act and hence entitled to the reliefs. This is particularly because, Section 16(5) contains a non-obstante clause as regards Section 16(4), and hence if the taxpayer is submitting the return within the cut-off date contemplated under Section 16(5), the timeline fixed in Section 16(4) loses its significance.

3. Of course it is true that, the learned Government Pleader opposed the said relief sought by the petitioner by pointing out that the impugned orders were passed in the year 2023 and 2024, and such challenge cannot be entertained at this point of time.

4. However, the claim of the petitioner is based on statutory provision, which specifically confers a right upon the petitioner and the said statutory provision was introduced subsequent to the issuance of the impugned orders with retrospective effect. Therefore, I am of the view that, the challenge can be entertained, even though there is some delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court.

Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of, quashing Exts.P1 and P2 with a direction to the 1^st and 2^nd respondents to reconsider the matter and grant the benefit of Section 16(5) to the petitioner, if he is otherwise entitled.