Suspension orders under Co-operative Societies Act must explicitly state suspension, reasons, duration, and require departmental sanction.

JUDGMENT

Devan Ramachandran, J The appellant – Society challenges the judgment of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.20119 of 2023, since it has quashed Ext.P4 alleged order of suspension issued by it against the 1^st respondent, as also Ext.P7 order whereby such alleged suspension has been extended.

2. Sri.Sasith Panicker – the learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the learned Single Judge ought not to have quashed Exts.P4 and P7 because the 1^st respondent has been placed under suspension pending an enquiry; and that it has been now well settled, through various judicial pronouncements, that Courts should not intervene in such administrative actions unless the same is perverse and unconstitutional. He contended that his client was constrained to suspend the 1^st respondent because she was acting against the interests of the Society and in a manner contrary to her obligations, thus constraining an enquiry to be initiated. He prayed that, the impugned judgment, therefore, be set aside.

3. In refutation of the afore, Sri.C.S Sumesh – the learned counsel for the 1^st respondent/writ petitioner, argued that Ext.P4 cannot even be construed to be an order of suspension under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (‘Act’ for short) and the Rules thereunder because, though she was merely instructed not to go the Society from 01.04.2023. He then pointed out that Ext.P7 uses the word ‘suspension’ for the first time, saying that it has been directed to be extended, but without specifying the period for which it would operate. He predicated that in the absence of the essential requirements that is required for an order of suspension, or for an order extending the period under the statutory scheme, it can only be seen to be a perverse and arbitrary action and hence vitiated.

4. When we evaluate the afore rival submissions on the touchstone of the impugned judgment, it becomes evident that the learned Single Judge has also assessed that Ext.P4 cannot subscribe to any notion of suspension; and consequently that Ext.P7 extending such, is also not tenable.

5. Apart from the fact that Ext.P7 is an order issued, admittedly, without any departmental sanction as required under the ‘Act’ and ‘Rules’, it merely says that the period of suspension will stand extended, but without mentioning to which date or period.

6. Interestingly, as correctly argued by Sri.C.S.Sumesh, Ext.P4 instructs the 1^st respondent not to go the Society, but without even mentioning that she is under suspension, or the reason for asking her not to do so. 7. As the learned Single Judge has correctly recorded in paragraph No.3 of the judgment, the case of the appellant is virtually in brink manship because, they say, without reference to any document or any input, that the appointment of the 1^st respondent was irregular and that it was done on “humanitarian grounds” by the then President of the Society. Further, an allegation is made against her at the Bar, which is also recorded in the impugned judgment, that she was manipulating milk farmers and instigating them, with an aim to create disputes within the Society.

8. As also rightly found by the learned Single Judge, in Ext.P4, not a mention of the afore has been made, except saying that the actions of the 1^st respondent affect the Society deleteriously; but without mentioning how and in what manner.

9. Therefore, going by any yardstick, one cannot find Ext.P4 to be an order of suspension and consequently Ext.P7 cannot construe the characteristics of an order that extends suspension.

10. Without doubt, therefore, the learned Single Judge has evaluated the factual scenario and forensic ambit correctly and we find no r