The limitation period for recovery of municipal dues is strictly enforced, and actions taken beyond this period are invalid.

J U D G M E N T

S.Manikumar, CJ.

Being aggrieved by Ext.P1 notice for recovery of arrears of rent for a period from 08/1997 to 10/2003 and Ext.P3 revenue recovery proceedings, WP(C) No.29952/2007 has been filed on the grounds inter alia that the action taken by the Kochi Corporation is barred by the period of limitation under Section 539 of the Kerala Municipalities Act . The respondent Corporation contended that as the restraint order has been issued within the period of limitation, i.e., within three years from 09.10.2003, further proceedings by way of revenue recovery is permissible. Going through the materials on record and after considering Section 539 of the Kerala Municipalities Act , a learned Single Judge found that the cause of action had arisen on 09.10.2003. Writ court further observed that though a restraint order has been issued on 08.05.2006, i.e. within the period of limitation, the revenue recovery steps, which have been initiated on 05.09.2007, is beyond the period of limitation. Accordingly, writ court interfered with Ext.P3 and accordingly, quashed the same. Being aggrieved, instant writ appeal is filed by the respondent Corporation inter alia on the following grounds:

“B) Since, rent from the 1st respondent continued to remain in default despite various notice, the appellant was constrained to resume possession of the shop room as on 09.10.2003. On

08.06.2004, distrait warrant was issued to the 1st respondent. It is thereafter that Exhibit P1 notice dated 25.11.2005 was issued to the 1st respondent demanding an amount of Rs.9,02,528/-. Further, Exhibit P1 Demand Notice was issued as early as on 25.11.2005 but it was challenged only when the Revenue Recovery Notice dated 19.09.2007 i.e., Exhibit P3 was issued. Hence, the challenge as far as Exhibit P1 is also belated. Thus, even though possession was taken on 09.10.2003, Exhibit P1 Demand Notice was issued subsequently on 25.11.2005. Thus, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Exhibit P3 notice issued Under Section 7 of the Revenue Recovery Act is beyond the period of limitation is against the facts and circumstances of the above case. Thus, these aspects were not properly considered by the learned Single Judge in the judgment under challenge.

D) Further, in para 2 in the Writ Petition, the 1st respondent had contended that his representation dated 12.04.1996 i.e., Exhibit R1(b) is one for the surrender of the shop room. Going by Exhibit R1(b), it is clear that the 1st respondent did not seek for surrender of the shop room as claimed by the writ petition. All that, the 1st respondent required as per R1(b) representation was to assign the room originally allotted to him in favour of his partner A. Asharaf and not for surrender of the room as stated in the Writ Petition. Thus, admittedly being a partner the 1st respondent is liable to pay the rent. This aspect was also not considered by the learned Single Judge.

E) In the reply affidavit filed by the 1st respondent it is clear that he has sublet the room to the other person without the permission of the corporation which is against the terms of the agreement and moreover going through Exhibit P2 it is to be noted that the petitioner/1st respondent has admitted his obligation to pay the rent till April, 2006. This fact was not considered by the learned single judge.

F) The demand in Exhibit P1 relates only to the period during which the shop room was in possession of the 1st respondent and interest on account of nonpayment of the rent. In fact, he was issued notice dated 28.07.1997, 05.08.1997, 09.10.1997, and 20.11.1997 to remit the arrears of rent. But, instead paying the amount he filed O.P.No.2136/1997 before the Hon'ble High Court. Subsequently after the judgment, he was again issued with notice dated 08.12.2000 and 15.01.2001 directing him to pay Rs.5,66,131/- as arrears of rent.”

2. In addition to the above, Sri.R.Ranjith, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant Corporation pointed out that