The court emphasized the necessity of resolving pending appeals before altering property titles, upholding the principle of finality in judicial determinations.

JUDGMENT

The petitioners claim to be the successors in interest of a certain Sri.Govindan Nair, who had concededly mortgaged his properties in favour of the Indian Bank, prior to his executing sale deeds in favour of his assignees, including the petitioners herein.

The Indian Bank, thereafter, took steps to recover the loan amounts availed of by Sri.Govindan Nair and consequently, brought the property in question herein to sale in the year 2009 under a Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam (DRT), in T.A.No. 218 of 1998. Consequent to the said sale, which was confirmed in favour of respondents 9 and 10 herein, steps were taken by the Bank, as well as by the auction purchasers to have the mutation of the property affected into their names. This was originally allowed and this impelled the petitioners herein to challenge the proceedings of mutation, which finally lead to a judgment of this Court, namely Ext.P11.

In Ext.P11 judgment, a learned Judge of this Court noticed the earlier proceedings which finally culminated in the order impugned therein and thought it fit, for various reasons recorded therein, to set aside all earlier orders, further directing the competent Authority to pass a fresh order after hearing all parties. These directions were issued on account of the various vitiating factors noticed by the learned Judge and it transpires that in obedience with these directions in Ext.P11 judgment, Ext.P12 order was issued by the Tahsildar, the 2nd respondent herein, confirming the earlier orders effecting transfer of Registry in favour of the auction purchasers namely respondent 5 and 6 herein.

The records show that Ext.P12 order was, thereafter, challenged by the petitioners by filing Ext. P13 appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer (herein after RDO in short), the 3rd respondent herein, and they assert that the said appeal is still pending. The petitioners alleges that pending this appeal, the concerned Authorities under the Transfer of Registry Rules have now issued Exts. P18 and P19 orders, affecting mutation in favour of the auction purchasers which, they allege is completely impermissible and contrary to Ext.P11 judgment. They further say, in fortification of their allegations that the impugned orders, namely Exts. P18 and P19, have been issued by the Tahsildar even when the Revenue Divisional Officer had, granted an interim stay of all further proceedings of Ext.P12 order in the appeal pending before him. On the afore assertions, the petitioners impugn Exts. P18 and P19 orders as being illegal and unlawful.

2. I have heard T.R.Harikumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Sri. Praveen Vyasan potti, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 5 and 6 and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the other respondents.

3. Even though there are several allegations and averments in this writ petition against Exts.P18 and P19 orders; the primary of them being that they have been issued when Ext.P13 statutory appeal had been pending and even though an interim order had been issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer., I am of the considered view that will not be permissible for this Court to enter in to a detailed evaluation of all these issues on account of the fact that, concededly, the statutory appeal against Ext.P12 order is still pending before the competent Authority namely the Revenue Divisional Officer. Obviously, therefore, if this appeal goes in favour of the petitioners, all action, including Exts.P18 and P19, would also be effaced and if, on the contrary, the appeal goes against them then these orders would certainly become enforceable. In such perspective, even though I find some force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exts. P18 and P19 orders appear to have been issued when an order of stay had been granted by the RDO, I do not think it to be fatal and therefore, necessary for this Court to set aside the said orders, because,