A Family Court may exercise jurisdiction under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act over claims for damages arising from defamation where such allegations are inextricably linked to marital cruelty or the matrimonial relationship, subject to final adjudication.

Dr. A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.

This Mat. Appeal impugns the order dated 15.01.2026 in IA No.1 of

2025 in OP.No.746 of 2024 of the Family Court, Thrissur.

2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for the disposal of this Mat.

Appeal are as follows:

The respondent herein, who is the husband of the 1^st appellant, had filed an Original Petition before the Family Court alleging that in view of the filing of a POCSO case against him alleging victimisation of his daughter, he had been defamed by his wife and hence he was entitled to damages. It was also his case that the defamation having arisen in circumstances arising out of the marital relationship between him and the 1^st appellant, and the POCSO case registered against him having been ultimately referred by the Investigating Officer on finding that there was no substance in the allegation in the complaint, the act of the 1^st appellant herein amounted to cruelty.

3. In the said Original Petition, the appellants herein filed an application questioning the maintainability of the Original Petition before the Family Court. It was their contention that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter since it was merely a claim for damages resulting out of an allegation of defamation, and hence it was the civil court of competent jurisdiction that had to consider the claim of the husband for damages.

4. The Court below by the impugned order found that cruelty in the matrimonial life was the fact in issue in the instant case, and inasmuch as it was the fear of the husband, that it it would tarnish his image and he would undergo distress and bear pain, that led to him claiming damages, it was a matter that came squarely within the jurisdiction of the Family Court in terms of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. The Original Petition was therefore found maintainable and fit for trial by the court below.

5. Before us, it is the submission of Sri.Dinesh Mathew J Muricken, the learned counsel for the appellants, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Neethu v. Pradeep [2025 (5) KHC 102], that since the claim for damages in the Original Petition filed before the Family Court was based solely on an allegation of defamation without any other allied relief, the Original Petition was not maintainable before the Family Court.

6. On a consideration of the above said contention, we are of the view that the impugned order of the Family Court does not require any interference at this stage. Firstly, we are of the view that even if it is a fact that the Family Court had found the original Petition to be maintainable as a preliminary issue, the appellants herein always have the opportunity to impugn the said findings along with other findings, if any rendered against them at the time of the final hearing of the Original Petition, if the ultimate verdict in the Original Petition is prejudicial to their interests. We do not think it prudent for this Court to interfere with an interim order of the Family Court, albeit on the aspect of maintainability of the Original Petition, at this stage.

7.Secondly, we are also of the prima facie view that the issue raised by the respondent husband in the Original Petition is one that would attract the jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, since the allegation of defamation stems from the apprehension of fear as regards loss of reputation of the husband, stemming from the relationship between the respondent and the 1^st appellant as husband and wife. The factual circumstances that obtained in the precedent relied upon by the learned counsel are clearly distinguishable.

In the result, we dismiss this Mat.Appeal without prejudice to the right of the appellants to impugn the finding of maintainability before this Court