A court cannot condone a delay in filing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without the complainant establishing 'sufficient cause' as mandatorily required under the proviso to Section 142(1) of the Act.

O R D E R

The petitioner is the accused in S.T.No.2548 of 2025 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class- I, Pathanapuram ('Trial Court', in short), which is registered on the basis of a complaint filed by the 2^nd respondent alleging the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ('N.I.Act', in short).

2. The petitioner has stated in the Crl.M.C. that the

2^nd respondent filed the complaint with a delay of 100 days. In order to condone the delay, the 2^nd respondent filed Annexure A2 application, inter alia, stating that the complaint could not be filed within the prescribed statutory time period since the original documents were misplaced in the office of its counsel. Although the application was opposed by the petitioner, the Trial Court, by the impugned Annexure A3 order, allowed the application, notwithstanding entering a specific finding that there was no sufficient cause made out by the 2^nd respondent by not filing the complaint within the statutory time period. Nonetheless, the application was allowed subject to the condition that the 2^nd respondent pays a cost of Rs.2000/- to the petitioner. Annexure A3 order is exfacie erroneous and unsustainable in law. Hence, the Crl.M.C.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the 2^nd respondent.

4. In Annexure A2 affidavit filed by the 2^nd respondent, to condone the delay of 100 days in preferring the complaint, it is specifically stated that the complaint could not be filed within the statutory time period as the original documents were misplaced in the office of its counsel. The case bundle of the case was only traced on

28.10.2024. During the interregnum, a delay of 100 days occurred. The said application was opposed by the petitioner. Nonetheless, the Trial Court, after entering a finding that though the reasons stated by the 2^nd respondent in the affidavit was not sufficient, but in the interest of justice, the application can be allowed, subject to the condition that the 2^nd respondent pays a cost of Rs.2,000/-

to the petitioner.

5. In the above context, it is apposite to refer to Section 142(1) of the N.I.Act, which reads as follows:

“142. Cognizance of offences.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section

138:

Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.

(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.”

6. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 142 of the N.I.Act undoubtedly reveals that, in order to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period, the complainant has to satisfy the court that he has sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the statutory time period.

7. A reading of the impugned order substantiates that the Trial Court has not adverted to the above proviso, which is necessary for deciding an application filed to condone the delay. Thus, I am satisfied and convinced that the Trial Court has committed an error by condo