1. Petition to quash proceedings under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Allegations of false and frivolous claims. (Para 1 , 2 )
2026 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 60553
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Jobin Sebastian, J
Mathews Wilson – Appellant
Versus
Anu Mol – Respondent
CRL.MC NO. 5128 OF 2026
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Shibin K.F., Renjitha B.
For the Respondents: Dinesh Mathew J.Muricken, Vinod S. Pillai, Nayana Varghese, N.R.Sangeetharaj, Jerry Peter, Navas V.A
The High Court's inherent power to quash PWDV Act proceedings under Section 528 BNSS is extraordinary and should not be exercised based on alleged falsity of claims or delay, as the Act has no prescribed limitation period and factual disputes require a trial.
Headnote:(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section 12 - Quashing of proceedings - Petitioners sought to quash proceedings under the PWDV Act on grounds of false allegations, unexplained delay of six years, and retaliatory nature of the petition following a dispute over a POCSO case - Inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 of Cr.P.C.) is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly and cautiously (Paras 6 and 7) - Mere assertion that allegations are false or frivolous, or the existence of disputed questions of fact, does not justify quashing of proceedings - Lack of a prescribed limitation period under the PWDV Act means mere delay in approaching the Magistrate cannot, by itself, be a ground for quashment, especially when continuing causes of action are alleged (Para 9) - Timing of the petition and external disputes are matters of evidence for the jurisdictional Magistrate and not grounds for a mini-trial by the High Court (Paras 10, 11 and 12) - The High Court is not expected to embark upon a meticulous examination of allegations at this stage (Para 13).
Facts of the case:
The petitioners, being the husband and mother-in-law of the respondent, challenged the proceedings in M.C. No. 32/2025 filed under Section 12 of the PWDV Act. They contended that the allegations of domestic violence were false, that there was a significant delay in filing the case, and that the proceedings were filed as a retaliatory measure after the husband initiated compensation proceedings in the Family Court regarding a false POCSO case. The respondent argued that a continuing cause of action existed, as violence was alleged even in May 2025, and that the PWDV Act provides no specific limitation period.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the allegations in the respondent's petition constitute acts of domestic violence and that the veracity of these claims, along with the impact of any delay or related litigation, are matters for the jurisdictional Magistrate to decide based on evidence.
Issues: Whether the proceedings under Section 12 of the PWDV Act should be quashed under the inherent powers of the High Court due to alleged falsity, delay, and retaliatory intent.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the inherent power to quash proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances of gross illegality or manifest injustice. Since the PWDV Act does not prescribe a limitation period, and since disputed questions of fact cannot be decided via mini-trial at the quashing stage, the petition was dismissed.
Result: Criminal Miscellaneous Case stands dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- practice and procedure
- family law
- crime and sentencing
Table of Contents
2. Petitioners contend delay, false POCSO case, retaliatory motive; respondent asserts no limitation and continuing domestic violence. (Para 4 , 5 )
3. Court held that inherent power under Section 528 BNSS is sparingly exercised and no limitation exists under PWDV Act. (Para 6 , 9 , 13 )
4. High Court may quash under Section 528 BNSS only in cases of gross illegality or manifest injustice; mere delay or disputed facts insufficient. (Para 7 , 8 )
5. Criminal Miscellaneous Case dismissed. (Para 14 )
6. Can the High Court exercise inherent power under Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
Yes, but only in cases of gross illegality or manifest injustice; the power must be exercised sparingly and cautiously. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 )
7. Is delay in filing an application under Section 12 of the PWDV Act a sufficient ground to quash the proceedings?
No, because the Act does not prescribe a period of limitation; delay is a matter for appreciation of evidence by the Magistrate. (Para 9 , 10 )
8. Can the High Court conduct a mini-trial to determine the truth of allegations while deciding a quash petition under Section 528 BNSS?
No, the court cannot embark on a meticulous examination or mini-trial; truth of allegations is to be adjudicated by the jurisdictional Magistrate. (Para 13 )
9. Does the retaliatory timing of filing proceedings under the PWDV Act alone justify quashing?
No, timing of filing is a relevant circumstance but not sufficient by itself to conclude abuse of process. (Para 11 )
10. Is the existence of a POCSO case and subsequent refer report determinative of falsity of domestic violence allegations at the quashing stage?
No, such matters are to be considered by the jurisdictional Magistrate subject to relevance; they do not conclusively prove falsity. (Para 10 )
ORDER
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the BNSS”) by the respondents in M.C. No.32/2025 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur, seeking to quash the proceedings in the said M.C.
2. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of this Criminal Miscellaneous Case are as follows:
The petitioners herein are the respondents in M.C. No.32/2025 pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur, filed by the respondent herein under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, “the PWDV Act”), seeking various reliefs under the said Act. The 1st petitioner is the husband of the respondent, and the 2nd petitioner is her mother-in-law. According to the petitioners, the proceedings under the PWDV Act have been initiated by raising some false and frivolous allegations and with an ulterior motive to harass them. It is contended that, apart from certain bald allegations of threat, no specific acts of domestic violence have been alleged against the petitioners. It is further contended that, if the allegation of threat were true, the respondent would have approached the police, and the failure to lodge any such complaint itself demonstrates the falsity of the allegations. It is also contended that the present proceedings under the PWDV Act were instituted while various other disputes between the parties were pending before the Family Court and other forums and that the present proceedings were initiated as a pressure tactic. According to the petitioners, the proceedings are therefore an abuse of the process of law and are liable to be quashed.
3. Heard Sri.Shibin K.F., the learned counsel for the petitioners, and Sri.Dinesh Mathew J. Muricken, the learned counsel for the respondent.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that, though the respondent had allegedly lodged complaints before various authorities against the petitioners, she had not approached the jurisdictional Magistrate by filing an application under Section 12 of the PWDV Act during that period. According to the learned counsel, this circumstance indicates that the present proceedings are an attempt to pressurise and harass the petitioners. It was further contended that, although the respondent alleges that she was subjected to acts of domestic violence in the matrimonial home, there is an unexplained delay of about six years in invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under the PWDV Act after she was allegedly ousted from the matrimonial home and separated from the 1st petitioner. According to the learned counsel, such delay casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the allegations. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that a false case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “the POCSO Act”) was caused to be registered against the 1st petitioner by using their child. It was submitted that, after investigation, the police filed a refer report stating that the allegations were false. Though the respondent thereafter sought further investigation and the same was permitted, the report submitted pursuant to the further investigation also concurred with the earlier conclusion of the investigating agency. The 1st petitioner thereafter instituted proceedings before the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking compensation in respect of the alleged false POCSO case. According to the learned counsel, the present proceedings under Section 12 of the PWDV Act were instituted only after the respondent received notice in the said proceedings before the Family Court. It was therefore contended that the timing of the proceedings clearly indicates that the present case is retaliatory in nature and constitutes an abuse of the process of law. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel sought quashing of the proceedings in limine.
5. Per contra, t