2026 Supreme(Online)(Ker) 68036
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, Preeta A.K., JJ
MANI VISWANATH – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KERALA – Respondent
WA 1948/2026
Important Points
Subject
Co-operative Law - Supersession of Managing Committee
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Natural Justice - Section 32(1) and (2) of the Act - Requirement of issuing prior show cause notice and consulting the concerned unions - Failure to follow these procedures without cogent reasons casts doubt on the bona fides of the authority - Presumption of tampering with records is insufficient to justify the exclusion of a right to a prior show cause notice when the inquiry officer has already had access to necessary materials (Paras 7 and 8).
Facts of the case:
An elected managing committee of a regional co-operative union was superseded by the functional registrar without issuing a show cause notice or consulting the state co-operative union, invoking an exception based on the claim that such actions were not reasonably practicable. The supersession was based on allegations of misconduct. The single judge upheld the decision, citing concerns over potential tampering with records.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the inquiry report indicated that the officer had already accessed the relevant materials and the committee had cooperated with the inquiry. Consequently, there was no justification for the apprehension that records would be tampered with, rendering the use of the exceptional provisions of the Act unjustified.
Issues: Whether the statutory authority was justified in dispensing with the mandatory requirement of issuing a show cause notice and consulting the relevant unions by invoking the "not reasonably practicable" clause under the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: Supersession of an elected committee is an exceptional measure. The power to dispense with notice and consultation must be exercised strictly and backed by cogent reasons. In the absence of evidence showing that a prior notice would have compromised the investigation (especially when materials were already in the authority's possession), the failure to follow the fair procedure under the Act vitiates the order of supersession.
Result: Appeals allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
administrative law
- natural justice
- statutory interpretation
-
co-operative society law
- governance and management
- supersession of committee
-
practice and procedure
- writ jurisdiction
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Renjith Thampan (Sr.), P.C. Sasidharan, Y. Jafar Khan, V.M. Krishnakumar
For the Respondents: K. Jaju Babu, Arun Chandran, P.N. Mohanan
JUDGMENT
Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.
1.The appellants before us were the petitioners in W.P.(C).Nos.26123 and 26446 of 2026, and they are aggrieved by the common judgment dated 08.09.2026 of the learned Single Judge that dismissed their writ petitions.
2. The learned Single Judge having elaborately recorded the facts in the impugned judgment, we choose not to reiterate those in this judgment. Briefly stated, however, the appellants, being members of the Managing Committee of the Thiruvananthapuram Regional Co-operative Milk Producers Union Limited were aggrieved by the order dated 25.07.2026 of the Director, Dairy Development Department, the functional Registrar of Dairy Co-operatives, superseding the Managing Committee in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 [hereinafter referred to as the “Act”]. The facts reveal that the order of supersession was passed without issuing any show cause notice as contemplated under Section 32(1) of the Act and without consultation with the State Co-operative Union as contemplated under Section 32(2) of the Act on the ground that it was not reasonably practical to do so considering the circumstances under which the committee had to be superseded.
3. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellants' contentions were twofold: (i) that there was absolutely no material available with the Registrar to initiate proceedings for supersession of the Managing Committee of the society, which had been elected through a democratic process; and (ii) that, at any rate, there was no justification whatsoever for passing an order of supersession without following the fair procedure envisaged under Section 32(1), and by dispensing with the requirement of issuing a show cause notice considering the objections or consulting the financing bank and the Circle Co-operative Union, as permitted only in exceptional circumstances under Section 32(3) of the Act.
4. The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions, proceeded to reject both contentions and dismissed the writ petitions. Essentially, the learned Judge found that the Registrar had enough material to maintain a substantial allegation pertaining to the supply of ghee to Sabarimala and the said allegation alone was sufficient to supersede the Committee. That apart, the possibility of the Managing Committee tampering with the records covering the subject matter of the allegations justified resort to the procedure under Section 32(3) of the Act and the exclusion of a right to a prior show cause notice.
5. In the appeals before us, we have heard Sri. Renjith Thampan, the learned senior counsel and Sri. P.C.Sasidharana, the learned counsel for the appellants in both these appeals and Sri. K.Jaju Babu, the learned Advocate General, assisted by Sri. Arun Chandran, the learned Special Government Pleader for the State and Sri. P.N.Mohanan, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent.
6. At the outset, we may notice the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Act. Section 32 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act read as follows:
32. Supersession of Committee.- (1) If the Registrar, after an inquiry by himself or through his subordinates or on a report of the financing bank, or the Vigilance, and Anticorruption Bureau of the Government or the Vigilance Officer or otherwise, is satisfied that the committee of any society,-
(a) persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or does anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the society; or
(b) wilfully disobeys or fails to comply with any lawful order or direction issued under this Act or the rules; or
(c) makes any payment contrary to this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or causes any loss or damage to the assets of the society, by breach of trust or wilful negligence; or
(d) misappropriates or destroys or tampers with the records or causes the destruction of records to cover up any