FIRs filed within six months serve as automatic applications for compensation under revised Motor Vehicles Act provisions.

ORDER

The present revision petition raises a very interesting question of law. The question of law is the interpretation of Section 166 (3) and (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Facts of the case

2.The case of the petitioner is that he was driving towards Oragadam Village on his way back home. The 1^st respondent's vehicle was driven by the 2^nd respondent in a negligent manner which resulted in injury. The date of the accident is 11.10.2022. He filed his Claim Petition claiming compensation under Section 140 read with Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in M.A.C.T.O.P.(SR).No.3280 of 2023 on 19.04.2023. The said petition was returned on 25.04.2023. The return reads as follows:

“Petition is returned as per limitation barred.”

Challenging the said return, the present revision has been filed.

3.Mr.Jaisingh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Claim Petition was filed with a delay of 8 days due to his treatment. On account of the accident, the petitioner suffered fracture in his left leg and so, he had to rely upon his family members for his day to day life. Hence, he could not file the claim petition within six months. He would state that he was suffering from disability as the Doctors have advised him, being a compound wound he would have to take bed rest and consequently, there is a delay. He would request a direction to be given in this Revision to number the MACTOP.

4.Considering the importance of the issue, I appointed Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan, Advocate, Madras High Court, as an Amicus Curiae. This Court places on record its gratitude for the ready acceptance of this assignment by Mr.N.Vijayaraghavan. The learned counsel has been appointed as Amicus Curiae in several matters by this Court and by the Supreme Court in matters relating to insurance and the interpretation of Motor Vehicles Act.

History of limitations to petitions for compensation

5.Before dealing with the merits of the case, it is necessary to deal with how the Law relating to Limitation arose in the Motor Vehicles Act.

6.The first statutory intervention with respect to Motor Vehicles came under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This legislation was in force for nearly fifty years. Under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the period of limitation for the purpose of making a claim was “six months” from the date of the accident. The rigour of the Section was softened by a proviso being added to the said Section. Under that proviso, it was left to the discretion of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the petition claiming compensation if “sufficient cause” had been shown. This applied for any length of delay and it was not confined to any particular period.

7.The Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, was repealed by the consolidated legislation in 1988. The said Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 came into force on 01.07.1989. Under the new Act, Section 166 was introduced. The period of limitation for filing a claim was six months. The unbridled discretionary power granted to the Court under the proviso to Section 110A was taken away, though not in its entirety, but was confined only to a further six months period. This led to a lot of litigations as claims were filed after the condonable period.

8.Taking into consideration the difficulties that have been caused to the claimants, the Parliament amended Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. The proviso which restricted the power of the Tribunal to condone the delay only upto six months (beyond the original period of six months) was deleted. This was as per Act 56 of 1994. The said amendment came into force on 14.11.1994.

9.Interpreting the amended Section 166 of the Act, the Supreme Court was pleased to hold in Dhannlal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and others [1996 (4) SCC 652] as follow