2022 Supreme(Online)(MAD) 30954
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 31.10.2022 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE S.SRIMATHY W.P.(MD)No.14397 of 2016 and WMP(MD)Nos.10658 & 10659 of 2016 M.Sethupathy ... Petitioner vs.
1. The Executive Officer, Arulmigu Gopinathaswamy Temple, Kamakshipuram, Reddiyarchatram, Dindigul Taluk, Dindigul District.
2. J.K.Gopinath Hereditary Trustee, Arulmigu Gopinathaswamy Temple, Kamakshipuram, Reddiyarchatram, Dindigul Taluk, Dindigul District.
3. K.Gopalakrishnan, Hereditary Trustee, Arulmigu Gopinathaswamy Temple, Kamakshipuram, Reddiyarchatram, Dindigul Taluk, Dindigul District. ... Respondents PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the respondents, dated 01.02.2016 and quash the same.
For Petitioner : Mr.K.Deepak For Respondents : Mr.P.Subbaraj, Special Government Pleader
O R D E R
This Writ Petition is filed for issuing Writ of Certiorari, to quash the impugned order passed by the respondents, dated 01.02.2016.
2. Heard Mr.K.Deepak, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.P.Subbaraj, learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents. Perused the material documents available on record.
3. It is seen from the records that the impugned order, dated
01.02.2016, wherein the Executive Officer of the temple has passed an order of dismissal thereby dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner has challenged the dismissal order in this Writ Petition.
4. The ground raised by the petitioner is that the 1st respondent is not a competent authority to pass the impugned order, for which the petitioner has relied on the Section 53(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 [hereinafter referred as 'the Act']. The petitioner submitted that the 1st respondent temple is a listed temple under Section 46(B) of the Act. If it is listed temple under the said provision, the Government is a competent authority to initiate action and the 1st respondent is not having power to initiate action against the petitioner. The said plea was refuted by the respondent and submitted that the said provision is applicable only for Trustees and not Poojaries. The impugned has been passed against the petitioner in the capacity as temple Poojari. The petitioner was performing the role of Trustee as well as Poojari. While performing the duty as Poojari the respondent is having power to initiate action under Section 56 (1)of the Act. This plea was denied by the petitioner by referring the Commissioner's order, wherein it is stated as follows:
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“8. Having admitted the facts of the case as aforesaid the modification of clause 3 sought to be made by the Joint Commissioner runs counter to his own observations inasmuch the office of hereditary Trustee and Archaka is inseparable and that the Archaka is primarily a hereditary trustee who is not 'appointed'. Further the provision made by the Joint Commissioner for regularising 'each one of the sons of respondents 1 to 3 who is now assisting them in the performance of pooja, to the post of Archaka is nothing but recognition of the hereditary successions indirectly. Moreover, clause (iii) stating that 'any archaka regularised under sub-clause (ii) may if eligible succeed to the trusteeship only on relinquishing the post of Archaka' is totally irrelevant and inconsistent. Because successor to hereditary trustee is not chosen from Archaka and it is only vice-versa, i.e., it is the hereditary trustee who, also happens to function as Archaka. Hence, the modification of the said clause is unsustainable.”
When the hereditary trusteeship and archaka post are inseparable then the higher authority to the both the posts would be the appropriate authority to take disciplinary proceedings. For the hereditary trusteeship, the appropriate authority is Government and for the archaka (poojaris) the appropriate authority is Executive Officer. Since the higher authority is Government for both the posts, then the government alone is having power to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is right in stating, if it is inseparable the Trusteeship should be taken as a post and the Government alone has power to take action and not by the other authorities.
5. At this juncture the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner's son has been appointed as Trusteeship in the year 2017. Now, the petitioner is claiming monetary benefits only until the petitioner's son appointment.
6. For the reasons stated above this Court is passing the following orders:
a. The impugned order dated 01.02.2016 is hereby set aside.
b. The petitioner is entitled to monetary benefits and other benefits until 2007, i.e., until the date of appointment of the petitioner's son, as a Tr