JUDGMENT

[Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.SUNDAR, J.]

Captioned main 'Civil Miscellaneous Appeal' (hereinafter 'CMA' for the sake of brevity) has been filed in this Court on

12.12.2023.

2. Captioned CMA is a statutory appeal under Section 173 of 'The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988' (hereinafter 'MV Act' for the sake of brevity) and it has been filed by an insurance company which had insured a car owned by one R.Kamal (second respondent before this Court) in which N.Vijayalakshmi was a passenger and she suffered serious injuries owing to a road accident on 03.07.2015. To be noted, N.Vijayalakshmi is claimant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.

3. Aforementioned CMA has been filed by the insurance company assailing an award dated 27.07.2023 made in M.C.O.P.No.6384 of 2015 on the file of 'Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal being Court of Special Sub Judge II, Court of Small Causes, Chennai' (hereinafter 'said MACT' for the sake of convenience and clarity). This '27.07.2023 award' shall be referred to as 'impugned award' for the sake of convenience.

4. Short facts are that owing to the aforementioned road accident on 03.07.2015, N.Vijayalakshmi (first respondent before us) suffered injuries and she made a claim of Rs.1 crore before said MACT vide aforementioned M.C.O.P.No.6384 of 2015 and said MACT after full contest/full trial awarded a little over Rs.83.57 lakhs i.e., Rs.83,57,520/- to be precise. Insurance company has filed the captioned CMA saying that this quantum is high. To be noted, captioned CMA by the insurance company is only on quantum and not liability.

5. Today, in the Admission Board, Mr.P.Suresh Srinivasan, learned counsel for insurance company and Mr.P.C.Ramesh, who is on caveat on behalf of the claimant are before us.

6. Learned counsel for insurance company assailing the impugned award (notwithstanding very many grounds that have been articulated in the memorandum of grounds of appeal) predicated his campaign against the impugned award on two points and they are as follows:

(i) 40% should not have been applied and that has increased the quantum of award vastly;

(ii) Disability percentage has been erroneously fixed at 90%.

7. On the aforesaid grounds canvassed, the points for determination that arise in the captioned CMA are:

(i) Whether said MACT was correct in applying 40% principle in arriving at the quantum of impugned award?

(ii) Whether said MACT was correct in fixing

90% as loss of earning capacity in the light of claimant having become paraplegic?

8. We carefully considered the arguments. We perused the case file before us and we are of the considered view that captioned CMA deserves to be dismissed and the reasons will be set out infra. To be noted, while setting out the reasons, we shall be setting out the points urged, discussion on the same and the dispositive reasoning together. The points, discussion and dispositive reasoning are as follows:

8.1 As regards the first point regarding 40% addition of established income, the dispositive reasoning is fairly simple owing to authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680 and more particularly paragraph 59.4 thereat which reads as follows:

'59.4 In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.'

8.2 In Pranay Sethi's case, Sarla Verma principle being principle laid down in Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 was upheld. As regards paragraph 42 of Sarla Verma's case, though Sarla Verma's case was partly overruled in Pranay Sethi's case ( paragraph 42 of Sarla Verm