O R D E R

(through video conference)

Heard Mr. T.Ravichandran, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. M.Rajaraman, Learned Counsel for the Second Respondent and perused the materials placed on record, apart from the pleadings of the parties.

2. According to the Petitioner, he had been employed as Supervisor and Supplier in the hotel run by the Second Respondent at Door No. 49, Mela Perumal Mestry Street, Madurai, which was closed on 09.10.2010. The Claim Petition in C.P. No. 10 of 2011 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) was filed by the Petitioner before the Labour Court, Madurai (hereinafter referred to as 'the Labour Court' for short) for several reliefs, including computation of wages for the period from January 2007 till 09.10.2010, which was resisted by the Learned Counsel for the Second Respondent by contending that the Petitioner had voluntarily left service, after receiving the entire amount payable to him till then. The Labour Court by an order dated 08.05.2013 dismissed the Claim Petition in C.P. No. 10 of 2011 after coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner failed to prove that the salary had been retained by the employer during the relevant period. This Writ Petition has been filed to challenge the said order.

3. The law relating to the nature of claim that could be considered in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, has been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a plethora of decisions. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has explained the legal position in Central Bank of India -vs- P.S. Rajagopalan (AIR 1964 SC 743) as follows:-

“15. ....in construing Section 33-C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of Section 33-C cases which would fall under Section 10(1). Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under Section 10(1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of Section 33-C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the legislature in enacting Section 33-C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words, though in determining the scope of Section 33-C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under Section 10(1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C.

16. Let us then revert to the words used in Section 33-C(2) in order to decide what would be its true scope and effect on a fair and reasonable construction. When sub-section (2) refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, does it mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer? According to the appellant, the scope of sub-section (2) is similar to that of sub-section (1) and it is pointed out that just as under sub-section (1) any disputed question about the workmen's right to receive the money due under an award cannot be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Government, so under sub-section (2) if a dispute is raised about the workmen's right to receive the benefit in question, that cannot be determined by the Labour Court. The only point which the Labour Court can determine is one in relation to the computation of the benefit in terms of money. We are not impressed by this argument. In our opinion, on a fair and reasonable construction of sub-section (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that may have to be de