ORDER

(Heard through video conferencing)

The Civil Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the learned Principal District Munsif Court, Vanthavasi, in rejecting the petition filed for extension of time, under Section 148 of CPC for paying cost as not maintainable.

2. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Despite notice has been ordered on the respondents and their names printed in the cause list, no one appeared.

3. The petitioner was the defendant in the suit. Since he was set ex parte on 19.10.2009 and an exparte order was passed, he has filed a petition to set aside the ex parte order in I.A.No.605/2009 and the said petition was allowed on the condition that the petitioner should pay a cost of Rs.200 to the respondent on or before 01.10.2010. Since he failed to pay the cost, the petition to set aside the ex parte order stood dismissed.

4. On 13.06.2012 the petitioner has filed a petition under Section 148 CPC seeking extension of time to pay costs of Rs.200. Admittedly the time for paying the costs got expired on 01.10.2000 itself. However, after waiting for 1 ½ years, the petitioner has filed a petition under Section 148 CPC for seeking extension of time.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would draw the attention of this Court to the Judgment of this Court reported in 2006 2 MLJ 729[Gowri Ammal vs Murugan, Anbu, Sekar And Saroja], in order to canvass his contention that the petition under Section 148 is very much maintainable and it ought not to have been rejected in limine as not maintainable.

6. In the said judgment a reference has been made to the judgment of the Supreme Court, in” Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India”

in this connection. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under:

“15. Referring to the above judgment, the Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India , while dealing with the very same question, would make the following observation:

41. The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to operate fully. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151 . We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the court.

42. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das , this Court considered a case where an order was passed by the Court that if the court fee was not paid by a particular day, the suit shall stand dismissed. It was a self-operating order leading to dismissal of the suit. The party's application filed under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code for extension of time was dismissed. Allowing the appeal, it was observed : (SCR pp.767-68) Page 1689 How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in t