Substantial justice prevails over technicality in cases of delay in filing appeals, affirming the appellate tribunal's discretion to condone delays under relevant statutes.

This petition impugns an order dated 25.07.2024 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal rejecting petitioner's application to condone the delay of 52 days.

2. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal observed that even if petitioner was taken to be unwell for two weeks, that would still leave 38 days unexplained.

3. Petitioner is an 85 year old individual. In the application for condonation of delay, petitioner has explained that he was under a reasonable impression that he would receive a copy of the impugned order as envisaged under Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, after which, he would instruct counsel to file an appeal. While waiting for the order, petitioner fell ill and was advised two weeks' bed rest.

4. It is also stated in the additional affidavit in support that thereafter, petitioner came to realise that he had to apply for the certified copy which he did on 24.07.2023 soon after his recovery from illness. 5. Considering the overall situation, in our view, the delay has been satisfactorily explained.

6. Moreover, as held by the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal v Bank of India and others1, unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to an Appellate Tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. The Apex Court further held that the Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal before it by

1 (2016) 1 SCC 444 virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the proviso to Section 20(3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [now renamed as the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993].

7. Delay is condoned to enable doing substantial justice to the parties.

By delaying the filing of the appeal, petitioner did not stand to benefit. If we do not condone the delay, there is a possibility that a meritorious matter may be thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice could be defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

8. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate action. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. The approach of the authority should be justice-oriented so as to advance cause of justice. If the case of an applicant is genuine, mere delay should not defeat the claim.

9. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that an acceptable explanation was offered by the petitioner and a case of genuine hardship was made out. The refusal by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay was a result of adoption of an unduly restrictive approach. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal appears to have proceeded on the basis that the delay was deliberate, when from the explanation offered by petitioner, it is clear that the delay was neither deliberate nor unexplained.

10. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal shall proceed with the appeal on the basis that the delay has been condoned, subject to satisfying the other requirements in law. At the cost of repetition, we clarify that only the delay aspect has been considered and we have not made any observation on the merits of the matter.

11. Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, all the interim applications also stand disposed.