Courts must adopt a liberal approach in considering delay condonation applications, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities.

ORDER

This Civil Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, whereby the application filed under Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of a delay of 189 days in presenting the appeal suit against the judgement and decree dated 07.03.2014, was dismissed.

2. The revision petitioners are the appellants in the unnumbered appeal suit and were arrayed as defendants 1 and 5 in the original suit. The first respondent is the first respondent in the unnumbered appeal suit and was the plaintiff in the suit. Respondents 2 to 4 in this revision petition are also respondents 2 to 4 in the unnumbered appeal suit and were defendants 2 to 4 in the suit.

3. The suit was filed for a judgment and decree declaring that the sale deed dated 23.09.2010, executed by the first defendant in favour of the fifth defendant, including the plaintiff’s 1/6th share in the first item of the suit property, is legally invalid, null, and void. The suit also sought partition and separate possession of suit item Nos. 1 and 2 into six equal shares and allotment of one such share to the plaintiff. The suit was decreed on 07.03.2014. Aggrieved by the said decree, defendants 1 and 2 preferred an appeal along with an application to condone the delay in filing the same. The appellate court dismissed the condone delay application.

4. The petitioner contended that the suit was decreed on 07.03.2014 and that she had applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree. She was informed by her counsel that she would be notified once the copies were ready. However, due to illness, she was unable to contact her counsel. After her recovery, she became aware that there was a delay of 189 days in filing the appeal.

5. The first respondent opposed the condone delay petition, stating that the petitioner had failed to specify the period of illness or submit any supporting documents. The suit, filed in 2011, was decreed on 07.03.2014 after a full trial. In the final decree proceedings, notices were served on 23.03.2015 to the first petitioner and on 21.03.2015 to petitioners 2 to 4. However, none appeared, leading to an ex parte order. Further, REP No.13/2015 was filed for cost recovery, and notices were duly served. The respondent argued that the illness claim was vague and unsubstantiated, and that the delay petition was merely an attempt to obstruct execution and defeat the decree-holder's rights.

6. Upon perusal of the records and considering the overall conduct of the petitioners, the appellate court found that the petitioners had not shown sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 189 days and therefore dismissed the delay condonation petition. Hence, this revision petition.

7. Heard both sides.

8. The right of appeal is a substantive and valuable legal remedy, forming an integral part of the adjudicatory process. Courts must remain cautious not to defeat such rights on mere technical grounds, particularly where refusal to condone delay may result in miscarriage of justice. Though the explanation offered by the petitioner for the delay is not entirely satisfactory or supported by medical documentation, it cannot be said to be wholly devoid of merit. Given the circumstances and the absence of any indication of mala fide intention or deliberate inaction, this Court is of the view that a reasonable cause has been made out. In furtherance of the principles of substantial justice, it would be just and appropriate to afford the petitioners an opportunity to pursue the appeal on merits.

9. In Pa