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2025 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 65503
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
A.D. MARIA CLETE, J
S.Sivasamy – Appellant
Versus
Maheswari, Rajasudhar, K.Murugavel, K.Kanagaraj, K.Jeganathan, Loganathan – Respondent
S.A.(MD)No.359 of 2025 | C.M.P.(MD)No.12614 of 2025
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr.R.Devaraj
For the Respondents:
Specific performance is discretionary; plaintiff must show continuous readiness to perform under the contract.
Headnote:(A) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 14 and 16 - Second appeal against the reversal of decree for specific performance - The trial court had granted specific performance, but the appellate court found the agreement for sale dubious due to the unusual payment structure and dismissed the specific performance claim, opting for a refund instead. The appellate court's reasoning on lack of readiness to perform was sound and supported by evidence. (Paras 3, 5, 8)
(B) Suit - Legal principles - The plaintiff must demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform the contract, and the relief of specific performance is discretionary.
Facts of the case:
Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a sale agreement with a total consideration of Rs.60,000. Paid Rs.50,000 upfront with the balance due over 2.5 years. The defendants did not execute the deed as agreed.
Findings of Court:
The agreement was found doubtful and specific performance was not warranted; the alternative relief of refund was affirmed.
Issues: The key issue was whether the agreement terms justified specific performance, given the large upfront payment and unclear readiness.
Ratio Decidendi: The court upheld the appellate court’s rationale that the arrangement was suspicious and that discretion in relief judgments does not warrant interference unless untenable.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. plaintiffs sought specific performance for a sale agreement with ambiguous payment terms. (Para 3 , 5) |
| 2. appellate court's discretion determined the relief based on evidence and plaintiff's readiness. (Para 4 , 8) |
| 3. court upheld the appellate court’s decision, emphasizing no substantial question of law. (Para 6 , 11) |
JUDGMENT
Heard.
2. This Second Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 06.04.2024 in A.S. No. 44 of 2017 on the file of the First Appellate Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Karur, by which the decree for specific performance granted by the learned Additional District Munsif, Karur, in O.S. No. 340 of 2010 dated 22.03.2016 was reversed and the First Appellate Authority decreed the suit only to the extent of the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount with interest.
3. The appellants/plaintiffs instituted the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale (Ex.A-1) executed on 03.01.2008 for a total sale consideration of Rs.60,000/-. Under the terms of Ex.A-1, the plaintiffs paid a sum of Rs.50,000 on the date of execution and the balance sum of Rs.10,000/- was stipulated to be paid within a long period of 2½ years. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to execute the sale deed and sought specific performance, or in the alternative, refund of the advance amount with interest. The trial court decreed the suit substantially in favour of the plaintiffs.
4. The substantial questions of law framed in the memorandum of appeal On a careful considered view of this Court, they do not, raise any real substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 CPC. The entire challenge is directed against the appreciation of evidence and the factual inference drawn by the first appellate court from the terms of Ex.A-1, the surrounding circumstances, and the conduct of the parties.
5. On appeal, the First Appellate Court re-evaluated the oral and documentary evidence filed by both parties and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled only to the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount, and not to the specific performance of the contract. This conclusion was mainly based on the nature and terms of the agreement for sale, marked as Ex.A1, which was executed on 03.01.2008 for a sale consideration of Rs.60,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs. 50,000/- was paid on the date of the agreement itself, leaving a balance of only Rs. 10,000/- to be paid within a period of 2½ years. The appellate court found it unusual that more than 83% of the sale consideration was paid upfront while such a small balance was allowed such an unusually long period for payment. In prevailing practice, no prudent person would enter into such an arrangement unless there were circumstances casting doubt on the genuineness of the agreement.
6. The first appellate court, as the final court on facts, considered in depth these factual aspects and found, on the basis of evidence, that the agreement itself was doubtful and that specific performance was not warranted. Instead, the alternative prayer for refund was rightly granted. The reasoning of the First Appellate Court is sound in law and supported by the record.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, since the sale agreement and its terms stood admitted by the defendant, the suit ought to have been decreed. This contention cannot be accepted, for the relief of specific performance is discretionary in nature, and the plaintiff must establish that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract from the date of the agreement.
8. In the present case, the First Appellate Court found the time stipulation in the sale agreement to be unusual and further held that the plaintiff had failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of the sale agreement. The first appellate court, in the exercise of its discretion, granted only the alternative relief of ref
