Differently Abled definition in the RPwD Act allows no benchmark for fee waivers but is subject to institutional definitions restricting benefits.

PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records of the impugned letter dated 28.03.2025 passed by the 1st respondent in C.No.1490/Regr/Acad/A4/2025 and quash the same as illegal and consequently direct the respondents to permit the petitioner having Registration No.H324049 to attend the regular classes, appear for the examinations, pursue his course and complete his studies without insisting on the petitioner to pay the Tuition and Special Fee.

For Petitioner(s): Mr.Rajagopal Vasudevan For Respondent(s): Mr.S.Siva Shanmugam Standing Counsel For TNDALU

ORDER

The instant Writ Petition has been filed to call for the records of the impugned letter dated 28.03.2025 passed by the 1st respondent in C.No.1490/Regr/Acad/A4/2025 and quash the same as illegal and consequently direct the respondents to permit the petitioner, having Registration No.H324049, to attend the regular classes, appear for the examinations, pursue his course and complete his studies without insisting the petitioner to pay Tuition and Special Fees.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner is a Differently Abled Student and diagnosed with Chronic Schizophrenia and certified with 10% mental illness-related disability under The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 . It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, according to the allotment letter, the “Differently Abled Candidates” are fully exempted from payment of Tuition Fee and Special Fee. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no necessity that the Disabled Candidates must have Benchmark Disability under The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1995”). Though the Act of 1995 refers “person with disability” means a person suffering from not less than forty per cent of any disability as certified by a medical authority, after repealing of the said Act of 1995, when (49 of 2016) (in short, “RPwD Act, 2016”). The word “person with disability” has been diluted and defined that person with long term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment under Section 2 (s) of the RPwD Act, 2016. While defining a “person with disability”, no benchmark percentage had been given and, by way of introduction of (r), the RPwD Act, 2016 defines a person with benchmark disabilities.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofVikash Kumar Vs. UPSC , reported in (2021) 5 SCC 370 and would contend that the person with disability must be given a reasonable accommodation. He would also relied upon the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulshan Kumar Vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection and Others , reportedin (2025) 4 SCC 90, which followsVikash Kumar Vs. UPSC (supra) and would contend that there should be equality for all the persons with disabilities and denying the facility of scribe or compensatory time constitutes discrimination under the RPwD Act, 2016.

4. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the allotment letter defines Differently Abled, the respondents cannot qualify the same as it is the benchmark disability. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned letter dated 28.03.2025 is in contravention of the allotment letter and in violation of the provisions contained in the RPwD Act, 2016.

5. Per contra, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petit