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2025 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 65224
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dr. A.D. Maria Clete, J
K.Pasupathy – Appellant
Versus
N.A.Jambulingam – Respondent
Second Appeal|S.A. No. 504 of 2014|M.P. No. 1 of 2014
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. R. Viduthalai, Senior Counsel, Ms. R. Revathy
For the Respondents: Mr. R. Krishnaswamy for R1 & R2, Mr. Anoj Elangovan for Mr. M. Govind Chandrasekar for R12, Mr. M. Karunakaran for R4 to R8
The court affirmed that a suit for specific performance can remain viable despite a lengthy delay if the plaintiffs have fully paid the consideration and retained possession, negating claims of bona fide purchase by third parties aware of prior agreements.
Headnote:(A) Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 19(b) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 54 - Second Appeal concerning specific performance of contract and legality of certain sale deeds - Issues of maintainability and delay - Court affirmed that the suit remains valid despite 22-year delay in filing, citing full payment and possession by plaintiffs as key factors - The defendants' claims of oral partition were not substantiated, shifting the burden of proof - The appellant's status as a bona fide purchaser was negated due to prior knowledge of the contract - Court found plaintiffs entitled to execute a sale deed. (Paras 11, 25, 28, 30, 31)
Facts of the case:
This case involves a dispute over the title and possession of suit properties originally belonging to a deceased individual, with multiple claims regarding agreements and partitions involving family members. The plaintiffs sought specific performance against conflicting sales executed by family members to a third party.
Findings of Court:
The court found the first defendant had not denied the sale agreement's execution and that possession was protected under the doctrine of part performance; thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to enforce the sale agreement.
Issues: The primary questions were whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable, if it was barred by limitation, and whether the defendants could claim protections as bona fide purchasers given their knowledge of the prior agreement.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that the entirety of the sale consideration was paid, and since no refusal to execute had been made, the limitation period had not commenced. Hence, the plaintiffs were entitled to the remedy of specific performance despite the lengthy delay.
Result: Second Appeal dismissed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. specific performance related facts (Para 3 , 5 , 6) |
| 2. defendants' admission and arguments (Para 7 , 8) |
| 3. burden of proof and partition discussions (Para 11 , 14 , 15) |
| 4. defendant's knowledge affects bona fides (Para 18 , 20 , 24) |
| 5. specific performance's limitations discussed (Para 21 , 27) |
| 6. final judgment and clarifications (Para 28 , 29 , 30) |
JUDGMENT
Heard.
2.This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 05.12.2013 in A.S.No.17 of 2012 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ponneri, by which the judgment and decree dated 10.12.2011 in O.S.No 85 of 2005 on the file of the learned District Munisif, Ponneri, were reversed.
3.The suit was filed for (i)Specific performance of contract directing the defendants 1, 8 and 10 to execute and register a sale deed in respect of the suit properties in favour of plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7;(ii)for declaration that the sale deed dated 30.06.2004 and rectification deed dated 30.11.2004 in favour of 8th defendant, and the sale deed dated 30.06.2004 in favour of the 10th defendant, are null and void; (iii) a permanent injunction; (iv) for Rs.25,000/- towards the share value of eucalyptus trees which were cut and removed; and (v) to pay costs.
4.For convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the plaint.
5.The facts necessary for disposal of this second appeal are briefly stated as follows: The plaintiffs’ case is that the suit properties originally belonged to one Arasu Reddy. They were later purchased by Venugopal Chettiar, father of the first defendant, in court auction sale; however, possession of the properties continued with Arasu Reddy. Arasu Reddy, subsequently died, leaving four sons: N.A.Murugesan (father of the defendants 2 to 4 and 6 and husband of 5th defendant), N.A.Durai, (7th defendant), (iii) N.A.Jambulingam, (1st plaintiff) (iv) N.A.Jagannathan, (2nd plaintiff).
6.After his demise, the eldest son N.A.Murugesan, as head of the family, has entered into a sale agreement dated 14.06.1983 (Ex. A1) with Venugopal Chettiar to purchase the suit properties for a total consideration of Rs.12,000/-, for himself and on behalf of his three brothers. In 1991, the plaintiffs and their brothers partitioned their other family properties but did not include suit properties in that partition, since the sale transaction concerning these suit properties had not been completed. N.A.Murugesan died in the year 1998. Thereafter, his legal heirs (defendants 2 to 6) and 7th defendant executed a sale deed dated 30.06.2004 in favour of 8th defendant in respect of certain items of property. The plaintiffs challenged that sale deed, alleging that the 8th defendant, under its cover, began cutting and removing of eucalyptus trees standing on the suit lands. A legal notice dated 02.12.2004 was then issued calling upon the first defendant to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 7. As there was no compliance, the present suit was filed.
7.Defendants 2 to 7 & 10 broadly admitted the foregoing facts but pleaded that, in an oral partition in the year 1991, all family properties, including the suit properties, were divided among the brothers, and that they, together with the first defendant, thereafter, executed a sale deed for their respective shares. They denied the allegation of felling eucalyptus trees, asserting that no such trees stood on the land.
8.The 8th defendant, appellant in this Second Appeal, averred in his written statement that, under a valid sale deed dated 30.06.2004 (Ex.B.1), he purchased the properties allotted to the shares of late N.A.Murugesan and 7th defendant, N.A. Durai, in an oral partition among the four brothers.
9.The 9th defendant did not file written statement. The 12th respondent in this Second Appeal is a lis pendens purchaser, impleaded for the first time in this Second Appeal, and was not a party before the courts below.
10.The trial Court dismissed the suit in its entirety. On appeal, the firs
