NDPS Act. Along with the contraband, the police also seized a Hyundai Aura car bearing Registration No. TN-65-AM-5609, and certain Android mobile phones.

4. During further inquiry, the Village Administrative Officer of Kilamangalam is stated to have produced the Toyota Glanza (KL-01- DD-5576) before the police. The said vehicle was allegedly being used by A1 Karthick, who has since absconded. The respondent police treated the vehicle as one connected with the offence and produced it before the Court in NDCP No.4/2025. The police further assert that the petitioner is a close associate of the absconding accused and, therefore, the release of the vehicle may enable future misuse or facilitate its alienation, which in turn may hamper the conduct of the investigation and possible confiscation proceedings.

Case of the Petitioner:

5. According to the petitioner, he is a third party, the registered owner of the Toyota Glanza, and all documents, including the Registration Certificate, stand in his name. He asserts that the vehicle is not involved in the commission of the alleged offence and that no allegation has been made suggesting that he either participated in or had knowledge of any narcotic transaction. He emphasises that the car was not seized from the scene of occurrence nor from the possession of any accused, but was produced by the Village Administrative Officer during routine inquiry.

6. He further submits that the vehicle remained immobilised in police custody for several months, exposed to severe weather conditions such as sun and rain, resulting in irreversible deterioration of its mechanical parts, bodywork and electrical systems. He relies on the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam¹ that retention of vehicles in the open police station yard amounts to undue hardship, unnecessary depreciation and waste.

7. The petitioner asserts that he is willing to furnish a substantial bond, two solvent sureties, an undertaking not to alienate or alter the vehicle, and a commitment to produce the vehicle whenever required by the Court or the Investigating Officer. He therefore seeks release of the vehicle under Section 503 BNSS, submitting that the order of refusal is contrary to law.

1 2025 INSC 32 Gist of the Impugned Order:

8. The learned trial Judge rejected the petitioner’s application primarily on the reasoning that:

The vehicle is allegedly linked to the NDPS offence, the petitioner is admittedly acquainted with the absconding accused, if the vehicle is released, it may be misused or sold, and considering the gravity of NDPS offences, the Court should be circumspect in granting release. However, the trial Court did not consider: the statutory protection embedded in Section 60(3) NDPS Act, the mandatory judicial process under Section 63 NDPS Act, the applicability of Sections 497 and 503 BNSS, the ratio of Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu² or Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam³, and the ability to mitigate the speculative apprehensions through stringent conditions.

Grounds of Revision:

9. The petitioner challenges the impugned order on the following foundational grounds: The learned Trial Court incorrectly assumed that seizure in an NDPS case automatically bars interim release of a vehicle.

2 2025 SCC OnLine 2276

3 2025 INSC 32 The judgments in Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu⁴ and Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam⁵ which affirm the jurisdiction of criminal courts to release the seized vehicles even in NDPS cases, were completely overlooked by the learned Trial Court. There is not even an allegation of knowledge, connivance or negligence on the part of the petitioner. The learned Trial Court disregarded Sections 60(3) and 63 NDPS Act, while These provisions explicitly protect bona fide owners and mandate a judicial inquiry before confiscation.

10. The learned Trial Court failed to consider that the vehicle’s continued exposure to the elements results in severe deterioration, causing disproportionate har