Compliance with statutory notice periods is imperative to avoid premature filing of suits. Failure to adhere leads to dismissal.

1. The plaintiff is the revision petitioner. His case was that a consignment of 145 bags of gramdhal was booked from Jakhodhere to Tuticorin under invoice No. 2 dated 10-7-1962, a copy of which was marked by the plaintiff himself as Ex. A - 1. The goods arrived at Tuticorin on 3-8-1962. According to P.W. 1, the goods were emitting a bad smell and the packages were considerably damaged. Such damage to the packages was noticed by P.W. 1 even on 3-8-1962. A request was made on 5-8-1962 to the railway authorities for the assessment of the damage to the packages and on such a requisition, the packages were examined and a certificate of damage was issued on 8-8-1962, and the petitioner secured open delivery of the consignment. On the basis of the certificate of damage, he made a claim on the Chief Commercial Manager under the provisions of the Indian Railways Act on 9-9-1962. The railway repudiated the liability.
The petitioner issued a notice Ex. A - 6 under S.80, C. P. C. on 7-8-1963, which, according to the petitioner, was received by the Chief Commercial Manager, Southern Railway on 8-8-1963. before noon and the suit was filed at 2 p.m. on 8-10-1963. The suit was resisted both factually and on the ground that it was premature and barred by limitation. The learned District Munsif who tried the suit held, on the points of law involved, that the suit was not barred by limitation, but that it was premature. On the factual issue whether damage was caused by the negligence of the defendant railway, he expressed his view that but for the suit having been prematurely filed the petitioner would normally be entitled to the damages based on the certificate of damage issued by the railway. The petitioner being unsuccessful before the trial court appealed and the learned Subordinate Judge, Tuticorin, agreeing in the main with the trial court that the suit was premature, dismissed the appeal. He also found that the petitioner was not entitled to damages as prayed for. As against this judgment the present civil revision petition has been filed.

2. Mr. V. C. Veeraraghavan raised three contentions two of which involve questions of law and the other relates to the merits of the case. His first contention is that the suit is not prematurely laid as was found. Ex. A - 6 is the notice issued by the petitioner under S.80, C.P.C. Ex. A - 7 is the acknowledgment thereto. It is alleged that Ex. A - 6 was despatched on 7-8-1963, and the same was received by the General Manager, Southern Railway before noon on 8-8-1963 and the suit was filed thereafter at 2 p.m. on 8-10-1963. The learned counsel obviously relies upon the presumption which could be raised under S.114 (e) of the Evidence Act that all official acts are presumed to be done in the normal course and contends that the suit notice Ex. A - 6 ought to have been delivered to the General Manager before noon on 8-8-1963, though there is no clinching evidence to prove the same.
The argument proceeds that the suit having been laid in point of time later than 12 noon on the appointed day, that is, at 2 p.m. on 8-10-1963 as is seen, from the plaint itself, it is stated that the action is in time and not premature. The argument is prima facie attractive. The suit notice, no doubt, was acknowledged on 8-8-1963. It may be that the General Manager of the Southern Railway received it before noon. The question however is whether 8th October 1963 has to be excluded for purposes of calculating the period of limitation. Unfortunately in this case if the suit was laid on 9th October 1963 it would be beyond time. Therefore it was ingeniously the plaint was presented at 2 p.m. on 8th October 1963, obviously to sustain