In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact unless a substantial question of law is involved. No such question arose where lower courts validly upheld a release deed and granted injunction.

JUDGMENT

The Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed in A.S.No.38 of 2023, dated 23.06.2025, on the file of the Additional Subordinate Court, Karur, confirming the judgment and decree made in O.S.No.26 of 2017, dated 30.11.2021, on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Karur.

2. The appellants are the defendants. The respondents 1 to 3 filed a suit in O.S.No.26 of 2017, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Karur, against the appellants/defendants 1 and 2 claiming permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 and 2 and their servants, agents, relatives or any one on their behalf from in any manner interfering with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The defendants 1 and 2 filed written statement and contested the suit.

3. The learned Additional District Munsif, Karur, after framing necessary issues and after full trial, passed the judgment and decree dated 30.11.2021, granting the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for with costs. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants preferred an appeal in A.S.No.38 of 2023 and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Karur, upon considering the materials available on record and on hearing the arguments of both sides, passed the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.06.2025, dismissing the appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Challenging the dismissal of the appeal, the defendants have preferred he present Second Appeal.

4. At the outset, it is necessary to refer the mandate of Hon'ble Supreme Court for High Courts in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, given in the case of Gurnam Singh (dead) by LRs., and others Vs. Lehna Singh (dead) by LRs. reported in AIR 2019 SC 1441, that the jurisdiction of the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and the relevant passage is extracted hereunder:

“18. Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the Courts below and/or the First Appellate Court and if the First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in the case of Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini , (2009) 5 SCC 264, despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law.”

5. Bearing the settled legal position in mind let us proceed with the present case.

6. The case of the plaintiffs is that one Govindasamy Konar, father of the first plaintiff and the first defendant purchased the suit property vide sale deed dated 12.07.1982 and he died on 26.05.2000 intestate. The first defendant and his mother Amirthalakshmi executed a release deed dated 06.02.2004 relinquishing their 2/3 shares in the suit property in favour of the first plaintiff on receiving consideration of Rs.2,00,000/-. The first plaintiff executed a settlement deed dated 12.02.2004 in favour of her daughters – plaintiffs 2 and 3, retaining the lift estate with her. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 got married in 2011 and 2014 respectively. The plaintiffs have been in possession and