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2026 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 22787

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
G.R.SWAMINATHAN, J
The state of Tamil Nadu – Appellant
Versus
V.Velmurugan – Respondent
W.A(MD)No.1330 of 2021 | C.M.P(MD)No.5539 of 2021 | W.P(MD)No. 2117 of 2020



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: R.Baskaran
For the Respondents: Sricharan Rangarajan

Applications where Central Government communicated previous approval before MMDR Amendment Act 2015 are saved under Section 10A(2)(c); delay due to third-party litigation cannot be used to deny lease rights that have already accrued.

Headnote:(A) Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 - Sections 5(1), 10A, 11 - Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 - Rule 32 - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Amendment Act 10 of 2015 - Applications saved under Section 10A(2)(c) where Central Government communicated previous approval before 12.01.2015 - Delay in execution of lease deed due to third-party litigation not attributable to applicant - Applicant must deposit security deposit under Rule 32 only when lease deed execution is proposed - Territorial jurisdiction: objection must be raised at earliest; part of cause of action sufficient.

(B) Section 10A(1) renders ineligible all applications received prior to 12.01.2015, but Section 10A(2)(c) saves cases where Central Government had communicated previous approval or State Government had issued letter of intent before the amendment, and lease shall be granted subject to fulfilment of conditions within two years from commencement of amendment.

(C) Delay in final decision cannot be put against the applicant if not attributable to him; rights crystallise on date of commencement of litigation and subsequent events such as change in law cannot deny relief unless third-party interests have been created or equities tilt otherwise.

Facts of the case:
The respondent (writ petitioner) applied for a mining lease for limestone on 23.02.1996. The application was approved at district level, by the Director of Geology and Mining, and by the Central Government on 16.12.1998. The State Government issued G.O. dated 10.06.2005. Despite these approvals, the lease deed was not executed due to a suit filed by a third party (O.S.No.324/2005) which was dismissed for default on 14.03.2012. Meanwhile, the MMDR Act was amended with effect from 12.01.2015. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.2117/2020 seeking execution of lease deed, which was allowed by the learned single Judge. The State filed this appeal.

Findings of Court:
The court upheld the single Judge's order, applying the ratio in Gujarat Pottery Works, Beg Raj Singh, and Bhushan Power and Steel. The application had progressed beyond mere submission - previous approval by Central Government had been communicated and a Government Order issued - thus rights had accrued, and Section 10A(2)(c) applied. The requirement of security deposit under Rule 32 arises only prior to execution, and since the Government never proposed to execute the lease deed, non-payment cannot be held against the petitioner. The objection regarding territorial jurisdiction was not raised in the counter affidavit or during arguments before the single Judge, and in any event part of cause of action arose within the Bench's jurisdiction. The court directed execution of lease deed within twelve weeks with reasonably revised terms.

Issues: - Whether the writ petition was maintainable before the Madurai Bench given territorial jurisdiction. - Whether failure to remit security deposit under Rule 32 disentitles the writ petitioner. - Whether the amendment to MMDR Act (Section 10A) renders the application ineligible. - Whether delay in execution due to third-party suit can be a ground to deny the lease.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Central Government has communicated previous approval under Section 5(1) for grant of a mining lease before the MMDR Amendment Act 2015, such applications are saved under Section 10A(2)(c) and the lease must be granted within two years from the date of commencement of the Act. Delay not attributable to the applicant cannot be used against him. The formal execution of lease deed is distinct from the granting of lease; rights accrue upon sanction/approval and cannot be defeated by subsequent amendments or procedural lapses not caused by the applicant. Result : Writ appeal dismissed. Lease deed to be executed within twelve weeks with revised terms. No costs.

JUDGMENT

(Judgment of the Court was made by G.R.Swaminathan J.)

The Government has filed this intra-court appeal challenging the order dated 28.02.2020 passed by the learned single Judge allowing W.P(MD)No.2117 of 2020 filed by the respondent herein (herein after referred as “the writ petitioner”).

2.The writ petitioner submitted an application on 23.02.1996 seeking grant of mining lease for limestone over the petition mentioned land. This application was formally approved at the District Level and forwarded to the Director of Geology and Mining. On 28.06.1996, the Directorate of Geology and Mining approved the grant of lease and forwarded the same to the State Government. The State Government, in turn, forwarded the papers to the Central Government for approval. The Central Government granted approval vide order dated 16.12.1998.

3.Even though the Central Government had granted approval and all that remained was only formal execution of the lease deed, nothing transpired thereafter. In these circumstances, the writ petitioner herein filed W.P(MD)No.10541 of 2000. Vide order dated 27.06.2000, this Court directed the Government of Tamil Nadu to dispose of the writ petitioner's application on merits. Even though such a specific direction was given, the Government did not act in the matter. Hence, Cont P(MD)No.114 of 2005 was filed.

4.At this stage, one Pagutharivu instituted O.S.No.324 of 2005 against the District Collector, Perambalur and other revenue officials seeking permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. It is interesting to note that it was the suit property in respect of which the application was submitted by the writ petitioner and which was approved by the authorities also.

5.In these circumstances, the applicant applied for extension of timeline for execution of the lease deed by representation dated 07.11.2005. The Government vide letter dated 21.11.2005 sought a detailed report from the District authorities concerned. A detailed report was submitted to the Government and extension of timeline for execution of lease deed was also sought. The suit eventually came to be dismissed for default only on 14.03.2012. Thereafter, vide letter dated 03.05.2012, the writ petitioner wrote to the District Collector seeking execution of the lease deed. Reminders were sent on 30.06.2014 and 01.07.2014. In the meanwhile, the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 came to be amended with effect from 12.01.2015.

6.The question that arose was whether, in view of this amendment, the lease deed could still be executed in favour of the writ petitioner. The District Collector, Perambalur vide letter dated 06.01.2020 wrote to the Government seeking appropriate clarification and orders in the matter. Since the matter had been hanging fire for over a quarter of century, the writ petitioner filed W.P(MD)No.2117 of 2020. The learned single Judge vide order dated 28.02.2020 allowed the same by applying the ratio laid down in AIR 1967 SC 964 (M/s.Gujarat Pottery Works Private Limited Vs B.P.Sood & Others) and the decision reported in 2017 (2) SCC 125 (Bhushan Power and Steel Limited Vs S.L.Seal). Aggrieved by the same, this writ appeal has been filed.

7.The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the appellants raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition itself was not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. He pointed out that the writ petition ought to have been instituted only before the Principal Seat and not before the Madurai Bench.

8.Though there is some force in this contention, we do not propose to consider this objection on merits. This is for more than one reason. Section 21 of CPC is to the effect that an objection regarding territorial jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest point of time. Failure to do so would preclude the objector from raising that contention before the appellate Court. Though the provisions of the CPC may not strictly

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