ORDER :

L. VICTORIA GOWRI, J.

Preface:

This Criminal Original Petition has been filed invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashment of the First Information Report in Crime No.494 of 2025, dated 09.06.2025, on the file of the respondent police, insofar as the petitioner / Accused No.3 is concerned.

2. The petitioner has approached this Court with the specific grievance that even on a plain reading of the complaint and the First Information Report, none of the ingredients of the offences alleged against him are made out and that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against him would amount to an abuse of process of law.

Case of the Prosecution:

3. The prosecution case, as could be seen from the First Information Report, is that on 08.06.2025, at about 10.30 p.m., the respondent police received information about unusual activities near Royal Sports Welfare Club situated on Puliyangudi Road.

4. Acting upon the said information, the respondent police proceeded to the place of occurrence. On reaching the spot, it is alleged that four persons, including the present petitioner, were found creating a ruckus in front of the club, thereby causing disturbance to the general public.

5. It is further alleged that when the respondent police questioned and warned them, the said persons abused the police in filthy language and thereafter fled away from the scene.

6. On the basis of the said occurrence, the impugned FIR in Crime No.494 of 2025 came to be registered on 09.06.2025 for the alleged offences under Sections 126(2), 296(b), 132 and 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Grounds for Quash:

7. The principal ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the allegations in the FIR are wholly vague, omnibus and bereft of any specific overt act as against the petitioner.

8. The learned counsel would submit that the FIR merely speaks about four persons having created disturbance and abused the police, but the role of each accused has not been segregated and no individual act has been attributed to the petitioner.

9. According to the petitioner, in the absence of a clear statement as to what exactly the petitioner had done, what words he uttered, whom he wrongfully restrained, in what manner he used criminal force, and how he intimidated the police, the very substratum of the prosecution case against him is rendered unsustainable.

10. The learned counsel would further contend that for an offence under Section 126(2) of BNS, there must be a clear allegation of wrongful restraint, namely, voluntary obstruction of a person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in a direction in which he had a right to proceed. In the present case, according to him, there is no allegation as to which particular police officer or member of the public was obstructed and in what manner.

11. Insofar as the allegation under Section 296(b) of BNS is concerned, it is contended that the FIR does not disclose the specific abusive words alleged to have been uttered by the petitioner, nor does it disclose the individual role played by him in uttering any obscene or abusive expressions in a public place.

12. With regard to Section 132 of BNS, the learned counsel would submit that the complaint does not disclose any material to show that the petitioner intentionally used criminal force or assaulted any public servant while such public servant was discharging official duty. The necessary factual foundation for attracting the ingredients of the offence is conspicuously absent.

13. Insofar as Section 351 of BNS is concerned, the learned counsel would submit that mere use of abusive language, even assuming it to be true, would not by itself constitute criminal intimidation unless there is a specific threat of injury to person, reputation or property, coupled with intention to cause alarm.

14. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied upon the order pass