Delay beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. without filing a condonation petition under Section 473 Cr.P.C. bars taking cognizance of offences punishable with imprisonment up to two years.

Order

This Criminal Original Petition has been filed to call for the records in Crime No.213 of 2015 on the file of the first respondent police and to quash the same.

2. The petitioner is arrayed as A5 for the alleged offences under Sections

147, 341, 325 and 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code.

3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 02.06.2015 at about

09.30 hours, when the defacto complainant was passing near Kuttaikarai, the petitioner, along with other accused, assaulted the defacto complainant and threatened him to withdraw the case earlier filed against the accused. Based on the said complaint, the present FIR came to be registered.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the allegations made in the complaint are vague and general in nature and no specific overt act has been attributed to the petitioner.

5. The learned counsel would further contend that the alleged offences are punishable with imprisonment up to two years and therefore, in terms of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the final report ought to have been filed within a period of three years. However, no charge sheet has been filed within the prescribed period and no petition has been filed under Section 473 Cr.P.C. seeking condonation of delay. Hence, the continuation of proceedings is barred by limitation.

6. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly conceded that though the FIR was registered on 02.06.2015, no charge sheet has been filed.

7. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record.

8. The scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) Scc 335, wherein illustrative categories have been laid down under which the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings. One such category is where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide or instituted with ulterior motive.

9. In the present case, this Court finds that the complaint is bereft of specific particulars and no material has been produced to substantiate the allegations. The accusations are general in nature and do not prima facie satisfy the ingredients of the offences alleged. Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, it is not in dispute that the offences alleged are punishable with imprisonment up to two years and therefore, the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. is three years. Admittedly, the charge sheet has not been filed within the said period.

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases and ors reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62 has held that the relevant date for computing limitation is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution. However, in cases where the final report is filed beyond the prescribed period, the Court cannot take cognizance unless the delay is condoned under Section 473 Cr.P.C.

11. Further, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 514, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the absence of any application seeking condonation of delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C., the bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C. operates and the Court is precluded from taking cognizance.

12. In the present case, admittedly, no petition has been filed under Section 473 Cr.P.C. seeking condonation of delay. Therefore, the bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C. squarely applies. Keeping the criminal proceedings pending in such circumstances, particularly in violation of statutory limitation, would