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2026 Supreme(Online)(Mad) 72311
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
T.V. Thamilselvi, J
Can India Star Studios Pvt Ltd. – Appellant
Versus
G.Sowmyamoorthy – Respondent
CRP No. 2947 of 2026
Important Points
Subject
Civil Law - Commercial Litigation
Act Referred
Commercial Courts Act, 2015
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: O.IX R. 13, O.VIII R. 1, O.VII R. 11
Limitation Act, 1963: S.5
Headnote
(B) Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Standard of Delay - The strict statutory bar on extension of time for filing a written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 does not extend to applications for setting aside an ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13; therefore, a heightened standard of "extraordinary circumstances" is not required for condonation of delay in such applications. (Para 3(a))
(C) Professional Negligence - Non-communication by Counsel - While non-communication of hearing dates by an advocate is not an absolute ground for condonation, a combination of circumstances including non-delivery of case papers and medical reasons may justify the exercise of discretionary power to condone delay. (Para 3(e))
Issues: Whether the delay of 71 days in filing an application to set aside an ex-parte decree in a commercial suit should be condoned to allow the petitioner to prove their defence.
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Adith Narayan Vijayaraghavan
For the Respondents: S Vasudevan
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. challenge against the trial court's refusal to condone a 71-day delay in setting aside an ex-parte decree. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. argument for liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' and the non-applicability of strict commercial courts act timelines to order ix rule 13 applications. (Para 3) |
| 3. respondent's objection based on arrears and limitation versus petitioner's request for an opportunity to prove defence. (Para 4 , 5) |
| 4. conditional condonation of delay requiring a monetary deposit to reopen the suit for final disposal. (Para 6 , 7) |
PRAYER
Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the the Fair order dated 16.03.2026 passed in IA No. 3 of 2025 in COS No. 144 of 2023 by the Honble Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai, and to consequently allow IA No. 3 of 2025.
ORDER
Challenging the order passed in I.A.No.3 of 2025 in C.O.S.No.144 of 2023, the petitioner preferred this revision.
2. Before the trial court, the petitioner filed application in I.A.No.3 of 2025 in C.O.S.No.144 of 2023 to condone the delay of 71 days in taking steps to set aside the exparte decree dated 09.09.2024 passed against him. The said petition was dismissed by the trial court. Against which, the present revision is filed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits the following grounds:-
(a) The learned Trial court gravely erred in applying an unknown and unsupported standard of “extraordinary circumstances” to a Section 5 application filed in a commercial suit. There is no provision in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, which prescribes a heightened or stricter standard for the condonation of delay in moving an application under Order IX Rule 13. The statutory bar on extension of time in the Commercial Courts regime is confined to the filing of a written statement under the amended Order VIII Rule 1, and is not extended, either expressly or by necessary implication, to applications under Order IX Rule 13.The Learned Trial Court thereby imported a standard unknown to the law.
(b) The Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is required to be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, as consistently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752; Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh, (2010) 6 SCC 786; and Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649. The Learned Trial Court, in adopting a hyper-technical and pedantic approach and in elevating procedural rigour over substantial justice, has acted contrary to the ratio of the said binding precedents.
(c) The Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the length of delay is not the decisive criterion for condonation; rather, the acceptability of the explanation offered is the relevant consideration. The delay of 71 days herein is a composite of discrete, contiguous and fully-explained segments, each backed by averments none of which has been on oath and/or by contemporaneous documents – none of which has been disbelieved by the Learned Trial Court on any specific or reasoned finding.
(d) The Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the “active participation” by the petitioner referred to in the Impugned Order relates entirely to a distinct, interlocutory phase of the proceedings - the filing of L.A. No. 2 of 2023 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, and thereafter the filing of C.R.P. No. 3656 of 2024-both of which were being pursued by the previous counsel. Participation in this preliminary stage cannot be equated with participation in the trial itself, much less with actual knowledge of the subsequent forfeiture of the right to f
