Item No. 41 KHOIROM Digitally signed by IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR KHOIROM BIPINCHAN BIPINCHANDRA SINGH Date: 2025.05.12 AT IMPHAL DRA SINGH 21:12:54 +05'30'

MC(WA) No. 3 of 2025 State of Manipur & Anr.

… Applicants - Versus -

Chingangbam Pateshori Devi & Anr.

… Respondents B E F O R E HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. D. KRISHNAKUMAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

O R D E R

13.05.2025 [D. Krishnakumar, CJ]

Mr. Lenin Hijam, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. I. Amri, learned counsel appears for the applicants, Mr. Kh. Tarunkumar, learned senior counsel appears for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel appears for the respondent No. 2 The present application has been filed for condoning the delay of

317 days for filing accompanying writ appeal. The reasons for delay in filing the writ appeal are mentioned at Para No. 3 & 4 of the present application.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 has strongly objected to the prayer made in the present application for condoning the delay of 317 days by filing an affidavit in-opposition.

Mr. S. Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.

2 has no objection to the prayer for condoning the delay of 317 days in filing the accompanying writ appeal.

Perused the averments made in the application and satisfied with the explanation for condoning the delay in the light of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 SCC OnLine SC 600) and State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. [(2025) 3 SCC 752], for condoning the delay of 317 days in filing writ appeal. The decision is extracted herein below:

“Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 SCC OnLine SC 600) :

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bone fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay, In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same