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2023 Supreme(Online)(MEGH) 284

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
W. Diengdoh, J
Shri Abhishek Agarwala & Anr. – Appellant
Versus
Smti Komal Poddar – Respondent
Crl. Petn. No. 41 of 2022



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, Adv., Ms. C.B. Sawian, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. S. Sen, Adv.

Domestic Violence Act proceedings are civil in nature, requiring appropriate procedures distinct from those in criminal cases under Cr.P.C.

Headnote:(A) Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section 12 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Petition to quash proceedings - The petitioner's argument hinges on the Magistrate's approach without proper jurisdiction - Proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature; therefore, the procedures outlined in the Cr.P.C. for criminal matters do not apply - The Court highlighted that an application under Section 12 should not be treated as a complaint under the Cr.P.C. - Court's discretion to quash proceedings is exercised sparingly. (Paras 1, 12, 31)

(B) Quashing of proceedings - The court determined that allegations concerning maintenance for the respondent and minor child must be adjudicated in the proper venue, and it would not constitute grounds for invoking powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Paras 27, 29)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner and respondent were initially married but the relationship deteriorated, leading to ongoing legal proceedings including an application under the DV Act for reliefs pertaining to maintenance and economic abuse claims.

Findings of Court:
The application under Section 12 does not constitute a criminal complaint and the proceedings under the DV Act cannot follow Cr.P.C. procedures applicable to criminal cases.

Issues: The main questions were whether the proceedings were civil or criminal and if the Magistrate acted outside his jurisdiction in summoning the petitioner and issuing a warrant.

Ratio Decidendi: The court reiterated that domestic violence applications must be treated as civil proceedings and that failure to comply with Cr.P.C. does not render the DV proceedings invalid. Quashing powers should be used cautiously and only in meritorious cases.

Result: The petition is dismissed.

Table of Content
1. petitioner seeks to quash proceedings under dv act. (Para 1 , 2 , 4)
2. allegations regarding jurisdiction and procedural compliance raised. (Para 6 , 8 , 10)
3. court emphasizes civil nature of dv proceedings and appropriate procedure. (Para 18 , 19 , 21)
4. decision underscores caution in invoking quashing powers. (Para 26 , 28 , 29)
5. final remarks on procedural adherence in dv cases. (Para 30 , 32)

JUDGMENT

1. The petitioner has come before this Court with this petition under Section 482 Cr.PC with a prayer to quash the criminal proceedings in CR Case No. 110 (T) of 2021 under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, (D V Act ), 2005 pending before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Shillong.

2. Heard Mr. K.Ch. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner who has submitted that the petitioner and the respondent were married in accordance with their personal law. However, after the marriage, the relationship between the two ran into rough waters and the marriage failed leading to them living separately. The respondent thereafter filed a petition for dissolution of marriage before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong registered as (Mat) Div. Case No. 45(T) 2018, which case is still pending. Another case has also been filed by the respondent being CR Case No. 330 (S) 2019 pending before the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong.

3. The learned counsel has also submitted that the respondent, two years after filing of the said complaint case against the petitioner has approached the court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong with an application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, claiming reliefs, provided under Section 18 , 19, 20 & 23 of the said Act.

4. The learned counsel then submits that there is no substance in the allegation made by the respondent in the said petition under Section 12 and even on merits, the case of the respondent will surely fail as the same was filed without any factual or legal foundation.

5. However, the main ground raised by the petitioner while assailing the impugned proceedings is that the Trial Court has approached the case without any application of mind and has exercised criminal jurisdiction where none is required.

6. In this regard the learned counsel has submitted that proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act are civil in nature and the procedure to be adopted by the court on receipt of an application filed by the aggrieved party is firstly to cause issue of notice upon the respondent. However, the learned Magistrate has instead issued summons upon the petitioner to appear before the court and in course of proceedings, has also issued a bailable warrant of arrest.

7. The learned counsel has submitted that this is contrary to the procedure that is envisaged under the Domestic Violence Act and even if the said application is, according to the court, deemed to be a complaint, the learned Magistrate has failed to take recourse to the provisions of Section 202 Cr.PC to postpone the issue of process against the petitioner, who apparently is residing outside the jurisdiction of the court and as submitted above, has even caused issue of a bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner on his being absent on the date fixed for the case.

8. This is clearly an abuse of the process of the court as the learned Magistrate has exercised powers without jurisdiction and accordingly, the proceedings is liable to be set aside and quashed by this Court on this ground alone.

9. In support of his case, the learned counsel has cited the following cases:-

(i) State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992) Supp.(1) 335 para 102(7).

(ii) Davindra v. State of UP ; (2009) 7 SCC 495, para 24.

(iii) Pepsi Food Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate ; (1998) 5 SCC 749, para 28.

10. Per contra, Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in response to the argument raised by the pe

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