2024 Supreme(Online)(MP) 2244
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
SHRI JUSTICE BINOD KUMAR DWIVEDI, J
Dashrath Kumar Talreja – Appellant
Versus
Manoj Thapa – Respondent
SA 2600/2022
Ankit Saxena,
A liberal approach must be adopted in condoning delays under the Limitation Act, especially for State litigants, prioritizing substantial justice over technicalities.
Headnote:(A) MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 - Sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Application for condonation of delay in filing first appeal dismissed by First Appellate Court - Court emphasized a liberal approach should be taken in such applications - Sufficient cause for delay established due to public holidays. (Paras 3, 6, 10)
(B) Condonation of Delay - The courts must prioritize substantial justice over technicalities, especially when the State is involved as a litigant - The delay of 12 days was adequately explained and should have been condoned. (Paras 7, 11)
Facts of the case:
The appellant filed a suit for eviction which was dismissed. An application for condonation of delay in filing the first appeal was dismissed by the First Appellate Court, leading to this second appeal. The appellant argued that the delay was due to hospital discharge and subsequent holidays.
Findings of Court:
The First Appellate Court's dismissal of the application for condonation of delay was set aside, and the delay was condoned, allowing the appeal to be heard on merits.
Issues: Whether the First Appellate Court erred in dismissing the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act?
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that a liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays, especially when the State is involved, and that the reasons provided for the delay were sufficient.
Result: Appeal allowed; impugned order set aside.
This second appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff assailing the impugned order dated 20.09.2022 passed on application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, whereby the application for condonation of delay in filing the first appeal has been dismissed.
2. Appellant had filed a suit for eviction on the ground of Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short hereinafter referred to as "Act"). The suit was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29.04.2017 passed in RCS No. 213A/2014. This judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was challenged before the First Appellate Court in RCA No. 138/2017, an application dated 27.06.2017 under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condoning the delay in the filing the first appeal, the same was dismissed vide impugned order dated 20.09.2022 on the ground that no explanation has been given for delay upto 26.06.2017 after discharged from the hospital on 24.06.2017. 3 . This order of dismissal passed by the First Appellate Court was challenged in the second appeal which has been admitted for final hearing on 08.08.2023 on the following substantial question of law:- "Whether, learned First Appellate Court committed error in dismissing the application of condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act ?"
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submit that as mentioned at page 15 of the appeal memo in paragraph 2 of impugned order, appellant after discharge from the hospital on 24.06.2017, 25.06.2017 was Sunday and 26.06.2017 was holiday on account of festival of Eid al-Fitr. For this, he has referred the calender of holiday prescribed for subordinate courts in the year 2017. This is sufficient explanation for filing the first appeal on the next working day i.e. 27.06.2017 and prayed for setting aside the impugned order and remand the first appeal to the court concerned for deciding it own merits.
5. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
6. It is appears that learned First Appellate Court appears to have taken hypertechnical view in deciding the application filed for condoning the delay. It is settled position of law that a liberal view should be taken while deciding the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act.
7. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others , reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under: -
- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of the justice that being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen in that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested ri