2023 Supreme(Online)(MP) 10137
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JA BA L PU R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH,
CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 8th OF AUGUST, 2023
WRIT PETITION No. 18589 of 2023
BETWEEN:-
ASHWINI PRADHAN S/O SHRI ASHOK KUMAR
PRADHAN,
AGED
ABOUT
38
YEARS,
OCCUPATION: LT. COLONEL 332/1 G.S. SURI
ENCLAVE 506 ARMY BASE WORKSHOP
DISTRICT JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI ASHOK KUMAR JAIN - ADVOCATE)
AND
1.
2.
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH CHIEF
SECRETARY LAW AND LAGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 4TH FLOOR A WING
SHASTRI BHAWAN NEW DELHI (DELHI)
SMT. PRIYANKA PRADHAN W/O SHRI
ASHWANI PRADHAN D/O BHAGWAN
SINGH PRADHAN, AGED ABOUT 31
YEARS, R/O 671/E/3, SANJAY VIHAR
COLONY, DAKRA GARHI, DISTRICT
DEHRADUN (UTTARAKHAND)
.....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI PUSHPENDRA YADAV - DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL FOR
RESPONDENT NO.1)
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………………………………………………………………………………………
This petition coming on for admission this day, Hon'ble Shri
Justice Ravi Malimath, Chief Justice passed the following:
Ashok Kumar Jain,
This petition is filed seeking for a writ of certiorari to quash
Sections 21 and 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (for short "the DV Act") as being ultra vires the Constitution.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the provisions
of Section 21 and 31 of the DV Act are unconstitutional. So far as Section
21 of the DV Act is concerned, the same would refer to the custody of the
child being given by the orders of the Magistrate. Section 21 of the DV
Act which reads as follows:-
"21. Custody orders - Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, the Magistrate may,
at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order
or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody
of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person
making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary,
the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the
respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any visit
of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of the child
or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow such visit."
3.
It is further pleaded that in terms of Section 12 of the Guardian and
Wards Act, 1890 (for short "the Guardians and Wards Act") the provisions
are quite different. The same reads as follows:-
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"12. Power to make interlocutory order for production of
minor and interim protection of person and property.
1. The Court may direct that the person, if any, having the
custody of the minor, shall produce him or cause him to be
produced at such place and time and before such person as it
appoints, and may make such order for the temporary custody
and protection of the person or property of the minor as it
thinks proper.
2. If the minor is a female who ought not to be compelled to
appear in public, the direction under sub-section (1) for her
production shall require her to be produced in accordance
with the customs and manners of the country.
3. Nothing in this section shall authorise-
(a) the Court to place a female minor in the temporary custody
of a person claiming to be her guardian on the ground of his
being her husband, unless she is already in his custody with
the consent of her parents, if any, or
(b) any person to whom the temporary custody and protection
of the property of a minor is entrusted to dispossess otherwise
than by due course of law any person in possession of any of
the property."
4.
Therefore, the Guardian and Wards Act would apply for a manner
in which an order could be passed. That recording of evidence is
necessary before an order could be passed by the Court. That a child is
required to be produced at such place and time and before such person as
the Court deems appropriate for the purposes of granting temporary
custody. None of this is present in Section 21 of the DV Act. Therefore,
this provision is ultra vires the Constitution.
5.
Reference is also made to Section 31 of the DV Act with regard to
penalty for breach of protection order by the respondent. That in the
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absence of any opportunity being given, a person can be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
year, or with fine which may extend to Rs.20,000/-, or with both.
6.
However, on considering the contentions, we do not find that any
of the pleas of the petitioner could be accepted.
7.
It is apposite to mention herein the Statements of Objects and
Reasons of the DV Act, which reads as follows:
"Statement of Objects and Reasons.—Domestic violence is
undoubtedly a human right issue and serious deterrent to
development. The Vienna Accord of 1994 and the Beijing
Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995) have
acknowledged this. The United Nations Committee on
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No.
XII (1989) has recommended that State parties should act to
protect women against violence of any kind especially that
occurring