The petitioner-employer is aggrieved by order dated 07.06.2016

(Annexure P/6) passed by the Appellate authority under the Payment of

Gratuity Act, 1972 and Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central),

Jabalpur, in case No.PGA-12/2016, whereby, the appeal preferred by the

employer under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

(hereinafter referred to as “The PG Act, 1972), has been dismissed on the

ground of delay.

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2.

The employee-respondent approached the Controlling Authority

under the PG Act, 1972 vide application dated 17.12.2009 under sub-Rule

(1) of Rule 10 of the Payment of Gratuity (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter

referred to as “The PG Rules, 1972) for issuance of appropriate directions

for the payment of gratuity.

3.

The case of the employee was that he was working with the

employer-petitioner as Clerk and had discharged his services from the year

1976 to October, 2009. Since the admissible payment under the provisions

of the PG Act, 1972 and the rules made thereunder were not made to the

employee, hence, the Controlling Authority vide order dated 03.01.2011,

directed the employer to pay the amount of gratuity of Rs.74,250/- as per last

drawn salary of the employee for 33 years service along with interest at the

rate of 10% from the due date till the date of actual payment. The employer

challenged the said order in appeal under Section 7(7) of the PG Act, 1972

and the appellate authority vide impugned order has dismissed the same on

the ground that the appeal should have been preferred within a period of 60

days from the date of receipt of copy of the order and the maximum period

of 60 days can be extended in case of sufficient reason. Since the appeal was

filed after expiry of about five years, therefore, a period beyond 60 days

cannot be condoned.

4.

The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-employer

submits that neither the employer was aware of the limitation nor he was

aware of the appropriate remedy, where, the appeal should have been

preferred and, therefore, when the execution proceedings were started, he

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approached this Court. He filed writ petition before this Court, which was

dismissed, thereafter, he approached the appellate court. Such a period of

about five years is not inordinate and the same is also not deliberate. Hence,

the appellate authority has erred in passing the impugned order.

5.

The learned counsel for the employee-respondent submits that

firstly, the petitioner’s conduct has to be seen as he has suppressed the

material fact at all stages. The first stage where he has suppressed the

material fact is the stage when he approached the appellate authority without

disclosing the fact that before approaching the said authority, the writ

petition filed by the employer was already dismissed by the High Court.

Even thereafter, when he filed the present writ petition, he has not disclosed

the fact that earlier also he filed Writ Petition No.7153 of 2016 and the same

was dismissed by this Court on 29.04.2016. He further submits that not only

on account of suppression of the material fact but even on merits also, the

petitioner does not have any case as it is a settled legal position that once the

authority is not conferred with the power to condone the delay, the delay

beyond the prescribed time cannot be condoned. He places reliance on a

decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ravi Khullar and

other Vs. Union of India and others¹.

6.

In response to the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel

appearing for the petitioner tried to explain his conduct by placing reliance

on rejoinder and he states that the employer had only come to know about

passing of the said order when RRC was issued and, therefore, he

1 (2007) 5 SCC 231

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approached this Court. Since no relief was granted by this Court in the

earlier writ petition, therefore, he had to approach the appellate forum

against the main order. Since this Court in earlier round did not adjudica