With the consent, finally heard.

This revision filed under Section 397/401 of the Criminal Procedure

Code (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.') takes exception to the order dated

29/06/2018 passed in Sessions Trial No.44/2017 by learned Second Additional

Sessions Judge, Umariya, whereby charge under Sections 467/120-B, 468/120-

B and 471/120-B of the Indian Penal Code are framed against the applicant.

Shri Manish Datt, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant by placing

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reliance on the factual backdrop which is reproduced in the charge as well as in

the FIR urged that as per the case of prosecution, applicant's younger brother

Raghunath Patel by projecting himself to be present appellant and by using the

mark-sheet/documents of present applicant secured employment in South

Eastern Coalfields Limited (SECL). Accordingly, employer lodged the FIR on

27/06/2014 as Crime No.220/2014. On the basis of this FIR, the investigation

was conducted and ultimately the matter travelled to the Court and Court below

framed the charges on 29/06/2018.

Learned Senior Advocate submits that there is no independent charge

made under Section 120-B of IPC against the applicant. A Division Bench of

this Court in Criminal Appeal No.657/2020 (Mahendra kumar Shukla vs.

State of Madhya Pradesh) decided on 02/09/2022 opined that mark-sheet is

not a 'valuable security' and therefore, offence under Section 467 of IPC is not

sustainable. Thus, the charge so far it relates to Section 467/120-B of the IPC

deserves to be interfered with.

So far charge under Section 468/120-B of the IPC is concerned, it is

submitted that as per prosecution story, applicant has not committed any

forgery and tampered with the document. As per the allegations, applicant's

brother had undertaken aforesaid exercise and secured employment on that

basis. Thus, Section 468 cannot be pressed into service against the applicant.

By taking this Court to the language employed in Section 471 of IPC, it is

urged that this provision comes into play against a person who fraudulently or

dishonestly used any document knowing fully well that it is a forged one. There

is no allegation against the applicant that he has either tampered any documents

or used the said document to procure any benefit. Thus, all the charges framed

against the applicant deserves to be interfered with. The matter may be remitted

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back before the Court below to reconsider the aforesaid aspect.

Shri Bhurrak, learned Panel Lawyer for the State supported the impugned

order dated 29/06/2018 (Annexure-2) and placed reliance on the FIR dated

27/06/2014, complaint and the enquiry report.

The parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated above.

I have heard the parties at length and perused the record.

Before dealing with the rival contentions advanced at the Bar, it is

apposite to reproduce the relevant provisions:-

"468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. - Whoever

commits forgery, intending that the [document or

electronic record forged] shall be used for the

purpose of cheating, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to

fine.

471. Using as genuine a forged [document or

electronic record] . - Whoever fraudulently or

dishonestly uses as genuine any [document or

electronic record] which he knows or has reason to

believe to be a forged [document or electronic

record], shall be punished in the same manner as if he

had forged such [document or electronic record]."

(Emphasis supplied)

The Division Bench in the case of Mahendra Kumar Shukla (supra)

has followed the ratio decidendi laid down by the Apex Court in Shriniwas

Pandit Dharmadhikari vs. State of Maharashtra (1980) 4 SCC 551 and

came to hold that mark-sheet is not a 'valuable security' within the meaning of

Section 467 of the IPC. I am bound by the aforesaid judgment and in view of

said judgment constraint to hold that the charge against the applicant under

Section 467 of the IPC is not sustainable.

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(SUJOY PAUL)

JUDGE

Sections 468 and 471 begi