2023 Supreme(Online)(MP) 13664
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WRIT APPEAL No. 316 OF 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
&
JUSTICE AMAR NATH (KESHARWANI)
ON THE 16th OF MARCH, 2023[
WRIT APPEAL No. 316 OF 2023
BETWEEN :-
SMT. SANDHYA SHARMA W/O
LATE SATISH SHARMA; AGED:
32 YEARS; OCCUPATION;
HOUSE WIFE; R/O VILLAGE
JAMTAL, TEHSIL MAIHAR,
DISTRICT SATNA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
(BY SHRI AJAY PAL SINGH - ADVOCATE )
.…APPELLANT
AND
1.
STATE
OF
MADHYA
PRADESH
THROUGH
PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF PANCHAYAT
AND
SOCIAL
WELFARE,
VALLABH
BHAWAN, BHOPAL (MADHYA
PRADESH)
2.
COLLECTOR
SATNA
DISTRICT SATNA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
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WRIT APPEAL No. 316 OF 2023
3. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DISTRICT PANCHAYAT SATNA,
DISTRICT SATNA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
4. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
JANPAD PANCHAYAT MAIHAR
DISTRICT SATNA (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.….RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI ANKIT AGRAWAL- GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)
This appeal coming on for admission this day, JUSTICE
SUJOY PAUL passed the following :
Ajay Pal Singh,
With the consent, finally heard.
This intra Court appeal takes exception to order dated
01.02.2023 passed in W.P. No. 2268 of 2023 whereby learned
Single Judge has issued notices to the respondents and granted
limited conditional interim protection to the appellant.
2.
The appellant is aggrieved to the extent learned Single Judge
has declined to grant interim protection against the direction to
register the first information report (FIR).
3.
The relevant facts are that appellant/petitioner was a
Surpanch till 2020. The specified authority/CEO, Jila Panchayat
Satna (respondent No.3) passed an order dated 02.01.2023 whereby
a recovery was imposed on the petitioner and in addition, the CEO
Janpad Panchayat Maihar was directed to lodge a FIR against the
petitioner and the other persons concerned.
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4.
Shri Ajay Pal Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that impugned order was passed in exercise of power
under Section 92 of the Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj
Adhiniyam, 1993 (Adhiniyam). Sub Section 4 of Section 92 makes
it clear that principles of natural justice are codified in the shape of
Sub Section 4 of Section 92.
5.
The two folds submissions raised are that -
i) under Section 92 of the Adhiniyam, the specified authority
has no authority, jurisdiction and competence to order registration
of FIR.
ii) As per Sub Section 4 of Section 92, an opportunity of
hearing should have been granted to the petitioner before issuing
any direction for registration of FIR.
6.
The learned Single Judge has mechanically followed the
Division Bench order passed in W.A. No. 1259/2021 (Sheshdhar
Badgaiya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others). In absence
of any power under Section 92 of Adhiniyam, the learned Single
Judge ought to have protected the petitioner from registration of
FIR. At the end, he placed reliance on a Single Bench order passed
in W.P. No. 16424 of 2021 (Bhupendra Singh Vs. State of M.P.
and Ors.) decided on 17.09.2021.
7.
Shri Ankit Agrawal, G.A. opposed the prayer, and supported
the order of learned Single Judge and has taken assistance of order
passed in W.A. No. 1259 of 2021(Sheshdhar Badgaiya vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh and others).
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8.
No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the
parties.
9.
We have heard the parties at length and perused the record.
10.
So far first point is concerned, in our opinion, whether or not
Section 92 gives the power to issue direction to register a FIR, fact
remains that FIR can be registered in accordance with the
provisions of Cr.P.C. It is for the competent authority to decide
whether FIR can be reduced in writing/registered or not. The wrong
quoting of a provision or non-quoting of a provision will not
deprive an authority to issue necessary directions for lodging the
FIR. The Supreme Court has considered this aspect in catena of
judgments.
“A. In N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre [(2004) 12 SCC 278]
it is stated: (SCC p. 280, para 9)
“9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the
law merely because while exercising that power the source of
power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to
a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the
exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be
traced to a source available in law.”
B. 28. In Ram Sunder Ram v. Union of India [(2007) 13
SCC 255 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 603 : (2007) 9 Scale 197] it
was held: (SCC pp. 260-61, para 19)
“19. … It appears that the competent authority has wrongly
quoted Section 20 in the order of discharge whereas, in fact,
the order of discharge has to be read having been passed
under Section 22 of the Army Act.
‘9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power
under the law merely because while exercising that power
the source of power is not specifically referred to or a
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reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by
itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the
power does exist and can be traced to a source available in
law.’ (See N.