The appellate court should be cautious in interfering with an appeal against acquittal unless there are compelling and substantial grounds to do so.

ORDER

Heard on IA No.19359/2023, which is an application for condonation of delay.

Considering the grounds mentioned in the application which is supported by affidavit, the delay of 69 days is condoned.

Also heard on IA No.19358/2023, which is an application seeking leave to appeal under section 378(3) of Cr.P.C.

The present appeal is filed against the order of acquittal dated 03.07.2023 in RCT No.4733300/2008 passed by JMFC, Indore, whereby, the respondent/accused has been acquitted from the charges under section 354, Signature Not Verified Signed by: SOURABH

452 of IPC.

The prosecution case is that a report was lodged wherein the prosecutrix PW/1 stated that the accused is her brother-in-law (jeth). With an intention to outrage her modesty, he entered into her house and caught hold her hand and pressed her breasts. She shouted then disclosed the incident immediately on phone to her husband. It is further stated that she came down running from the first floor and met PW/3 Naresh Wanhani on Sindhi Colony Square and narrated the incident.

The trial court disbelieved the prosecution story on the ground that as per the version of prosecutrix PW/1, the accused was residing separately in another house and she was residing on the first floor of the house and her in-laws residing on the ground floor. The prosecutrix could not clarify that how the accused reached to the room of the prosecutrix when on the ground floor in- laws were staying. She was staying on the first floor. Apart from that, the prosecutrix did not narrate the incident to the in-laws who were residing on the ground floor. According to her, she met with Naresh Wanhani PW/3, who in his statement stated that the prosecutrix came running from her house and stated that she was subjected to Mar Peet by the accused persons. He did not state that the prosecutrix has disclosed about commission of offence under section

354 of IPC.

The court after assimilation of entire facts and evidence on record has acquitted the respondent. This court does not find any error in the order of acquittal. The scope of interference against the order of acquittal is no longer res-integra.

Regarding scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Vs. K. Narsimhachary reported in Signature Not Verified Signed by: SOURABH (2005) 8 SCC 364 said that as per well settled principle, if two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of acquittal recorded by the lower Court; it can only be interpreted where the material on record leads to sole inescapable conclusion of the guilt of accused. In the case of T. Subramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 1 SCC 401, the Apex Court has reiterated the same principle relying upon said judgment and by interfering in appeal the judgment of the High Court was set aside restoring the judgment of the trial court acquitting the accused In the case of K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan, (008) 1 SCC 258, the Apex Court has observed that in case two views are possible, the appellate Court shall not reverse the judgment of acquittal only because the another view may be possibly taken.

The Apex Court has held in the case of Mahavir Singh Vs. State of M.P., (2016) 10 SCC 220 that in the cases of acquittal by the court of law, the court has to be very cautious in interfering in an appeal unless there are compelling and substantial grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. The relevant paras 11 and 12 of the said judgment of Mahavir Singh (supra) quoted as under:-

"11. We have heard the learned counsel on either side at length and perused the material available on record. Now it is imperative to look into the scope of interference by the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal and whether the High Court was justified in convicting the accused under Section 302, IPC by reversing the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.

12.In the criminal jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be