1. My only regret in disposing of the review petition is that it has had a staggered disposal which it did not deserve. Today, therefore, immediately after counsel are heard and authorities cited are reviewed. I consider it appropriate to dispose of the petition instantly to make amends for the delayed disposal of the application.

2. This application for review is by the plaintiff/respondent and arises out of an order passed by me on 10-8-1987 in Misc. Appeal No. 141 of 1985 (reported in AIR 1989 NOC 13) wherein I was required to interpret the provisions, inter alia, of Sections 34 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, for short, "the Act'. I took the view in that appeal that the judgment of the trial Court impugned before me was not sustainable in law because of infractions of those provisions. What is not disputed even today is that the plaintiff/respondent had instituted the suit on 19-6-1985 in which he had obtained a temporary injunction under Section 151, C.P.C. on 22-6-1985 against the defendant appellants, State of Madhya Pradesh. It is true that thereafter, the litigation had a chequered career and the matter at two stages reached at the highest seat of justice at the banks of Jamuna, a long way from Chambal. But, unhappily for the plaintiff the question mooted before me in the appeal was kept open by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Indeed, this position, I had examined in rendering the judgment in the appeal aforesaid, at para 10 thereof. I was impressed by appellants grievance that in rendering the impugned order the learned Additional District Judge had totally ignored the application made under Section 34 of the Act by the defendant/ appellant on 21-6-1985 as he continued to proceed with the suit by not only granting ad interim injunction, but also confirming the same, over-looking the relevant provisions of the Act.

3. At para 16 of the judgment under review, it was held as follows :
"There can be no escape route for the Civil Court in which a Civil suit is pending and an application under Section 34 is pending disposal to do anything else under any other law, even under the Code of Civil Procedure, before disposing of the said application, one way or the other. To keep the application pending and doing something else by refusing to exercise its jurisdiction one way or the other under Section 34 is not legally permissible. This position is trade clear by Section 41 itself which requires a Civil Court to follow first the provision of the Act and the Court is mandated to act "subject to the provisions of the Act". (Emphasis added)

4. True it is, as Shri Gupta has submitted before me today, at para 15 of the judgment, it was observed that no authority was cited before me on that date for the proposition that without disposing of an application under Section 34 of the Act, a Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction independently, under the Code of Civil Procedure, by passing the provisions of the Act. Today, therefore, Shri Gupta took enough pains to collect a number of authorities and has placed the same before me to persuade me in hold that the view that I had taken in that matter needs to be reviewed. However, despite giving my anxious consideration to each and every submission made by learned counsel and to the decisions cited, I have not been able to agree with Shri Gupta that the view I took in the judgment under review is grossly erroneous or that it suffers a " material error manifest on the face of the order which undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice". I do not think if it is necessary to reiterate in any other manner the law encapsuled in the crucial holding just quoted of their Lordships of the supreme Court on the ambit of Review jurisdiction ( See Sow Chandrakanta, AIR 1975 SC 1500; Col. Avtar Singh, AIR 1980 SC 2041).

5. However, it is my constitutional duty to do justice to the labour expended by Shri Gupta by looking into the authorities cited and that exercise I must take w