Age determination in juvenile cases can include school admission registers as valid evidence beyond affidavits.

1. Heard.

2. This Criminal Revision under S.397 read with S.401 of Code of Criminal Procedure , is directed against the order dated 27-11-2013 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Jaura, District Morena in Special Sessions Trial No. 02/2013. By the impugned order, the application of the petitioner under S.7 - A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 [for short 'the Act'] is rejected.

3. It is canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is accused under S.377, S.294 of IPC and S.3, S.4 & S.5 of P.O.C.S.O. Act, 2012 . The alleged incident took place on 06-02-2013. The prosecution mentioned the age of petitioner as 19 years 6 months. The petitioner preferred an application before the Court below, stating that the petitioner was born on 15-07-1996. On the date of incident, he was juvenile. He has not studied in any school. In addition, it is contended that the petitioner's horoscope (Ex.A - 1) shows that the petitioner was born on 15-07-1996. By placing reliance on the medical report / ossification test, it is contended that the age of the petitioner is between 16-17 years on 17-07-2013. Thus, on the date of incident, he was juvenile.

4. Shri. Ankur Maheshwari, learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Jabar Singh v. Dinesh , 2010 (3) SCC 757, submits that the admission register of the school does not fulfill the requirement of R.12(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Rules, namely, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rule, 2007 [for short "2007 Rules"]. Putting it simply, Shri. Maheshwari, submits that the said provision shows that the evidence for the purpose of age determination should be either (i) matriculation or equivalent certificate; and in absence thereof (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school first attended; and in absence thereof (iii) the birth certificate given by a Corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat. If the aforesaid documents mentioned in (i) (ii) and (iii) are not available, the medical opinion will prevail and should be treated as conclusive proof. He submits that no stretch of imagination, the admission register can be equated with the date of birth certificate from the school. Heavy reliance is placed on paragraph 27 of the judgment in Jabar Singh (supra).

5. Prayer is opposed by Shri. Awasthi, learned Panel Lawyer for the respondent - State.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. The judgment of Jabar Singh (supra) is recently considered by the Apex Court in 2012 (9) SCC 750 [ Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh ]. The Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment in AshwaniKumar Saxena (supra) opined that it has its own reservations on the view expressed by the Bench in case of Jabar Singh (supra). Thereafter, in Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra), the Apex Court considered the entire scheme of S.7 - A of the Act and R.12 of 2007 Rules. The Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the judgment opined that S.7 - A of the Act has used the expressions "court shall make an inquiry", "take such evidence as may be necessary" and "but not an affidavit". It is held that the Court or the Board can accept as evidence something more than an affidavit i. e. the Court or the Board can accept documents, certificates, etc. as evidence, need not be oral evidence. R.12 was considered along with S.7 - A of the Act which uses the expression "prima facie" and "on the basis of physical appearance" or "documents, if available". R.12(3) used the expression "by seeking evidence by obtaining". These expressions are read by the Apex Court to show that it r