IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIMANSHU JOSHI

th

ON THE 15 OF JANUARY, 2026

MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 8508 of 2021

SURENDRA SINGH RAJPOOT

Versus

MUNNALAL JAIN

Appearance:

Shri Vikram Kumar - Advocate for the applicant.

ORDER

Heard on I.A. No.16925/2021 - application under Section 5 of

Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

Considering the averments made in the application, supported by an

affidavit of the applicant, I find that good and sufficient cause is made out to condone the delay. Hence, the IA is allowed. Delay in filing the appeal is

hereby condoned.

Also heard on the application under Section 378(4) of CrPC for grant

of leave to appeal.

This petition has been filed by the applicant against the judgment

passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, District Sagar dated 16.12.2019 in Criminal Case No.450/2013, whereby the learned trial Court

has acquitted the respondent for the charge under Section 138 of NI Act.

2. Aforesaid criminal case was instituted on the basis of private

complaint filed by the victim/applicant.

3. The question before this Court is whether instant appeal is covered under proviso to Section 413 of BNSS (372 of Cr.P.C.).

4. The aforesaid issue is no longer res integra in light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Celestium Financial Vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025 SCC Online SC 1320. The issue arose in said adjudication was whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by treating the complainant as a victim within the meaning prescribed under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. 5. It is observed by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 9 and 10 of Celestium Financial (supra) as under:-

"9. In the circumstances, we find that Section 138 of the Act being in the nature of a penal provision by a deeming fiction against an accused who is said to have committed an offence under the said provision, if acquitted, can be proceeded against by a victim of the said offence, namely, the person who is entitled to the proceeds of a cheque which has been dishonoured, in terms of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, as a victim. As already noted, a victim of an offence could also be a complainant. In such a case, an appeal can be preferred either under the proviso to Section 372 or under Section 378 by such a victim. In the absence of the proviso to Section 372, a victim of an offence could not have filed an appeal as such, unless he was also a complainant, in which event he could maintain an appeal if special leave to appeal had been granted by the High Court and if no such special leave was granted then his appeal would not be maintainable at all. On the other hand, if the victim of an offence, who may or may not be the complainant, proceeds under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, then in our view, such a victim need not seek special leave to appeal from the High Court. In other words, the victim of an offence would have the right to prefer an appeal, inter alia, against an order of acquittal in terms of the proviso to Section 372 without seeking any special leave to appeal from the High Court only on the grounds mentioned therein. A person who is a complainant under Section 200 of the CrPC who complains about the offence committed by a person who is charged as an accused under Section 138 of the Act, thus has the right to prefer an appeal as a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.

10. As already noted, the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC was inserted in the statute book only with effect from 31.12.2009. The object and reason for such insertion must be realised and must be given its full effect to by a court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the victim of an offence has the right to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, irre