IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE GAJENDRA SINGH CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 925 of 2014 PANKAJ MEHTA Versus VISHAL HUNDAR AND 2 ORS. AND OTHERS Appearance:

Shri Pankaj Soni, learned counsel for the appellant.

Shri Ajit Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the respondents.

HEARD ON : 06.11.2025 POSTED ON : 13.02.2026 ORDER This is an acquittal appeal filed under section 378 (4) of Cr.P.C. by the complainant against the judgment dated 24.09.2012 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore (M.P.) in Criminal Complaint Case No.38997/07 whereby the learned Trial Court acquitted the respondents/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1881”). Along with this appeal, an application under section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment was also filed and the said application was allowed by this Court on 02.05.2014.

02. Learned counsel for the appellant/complainant submits that though leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. has been granted by this Court on 02.05.2014, but recently the Supreme Court in the matter of M/s. Celestium Financial Vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. reported in 2025 INSC 804 held that the complainant in a complaint filed under section 138 of the Act of 1881 is also a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) of Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 2(y) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the “BNSS”). The Supreme Court has further held that the complainant in a complaint under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 can also be entitled to file an appeal under proviso to section 372 Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 413 of the BNSS.

03. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:-

"7. xxx xxx xxx

7.1 xxx xxx xxx 7.2 xxx xxx xxx 7.3 xxx xxx xxx 7.4 xxx xxx xxx 7.5 xxx xxx xxx 7.6 xxx xxx xxx

7.7 In the context of offences under the Act, particularly under Section 138 of the said Act, the complainant is clearly the aggrieved party who has suffered economic loss and injury due to the default in payment by the accused owing to the dishonour of the cheque which is deemed to be an offence under that provision. In such circumstances, it would be just, reasonable and in consonance with the spirit of the CrPC to hold that the complainant under the Act also qualifies as a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. Consequently, such a complainant ought to be extended the benefit of the proviso to Section 372, thereby enabling him to maintain an appeal against an order of acquittal in his own right without the cheque which is deemed to be an offence under that provision. In such circumstances, it would be just, reasonable and in consonance with the spirit of the CrPC to hold that the complainant under the Act also qualifies as a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. Consequently, such a complainant ought to be extended the benefit of the proviso to Section 372, thereby enabling him to maintain an appeal against an order of acquittal in his own right without having to seek special leave under Section 378(4) of the CrPC. having to seek special leave under Section 378(4) of the CrPC.

7.8 In the case of an offence alleged against an accused under Section 138 of the Act, we are of the view that the complainant is indeed the victim owing to the alleged dishonour of a cheque. In the circumstances, the complainant can proceed as per the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC and he may exercise such an option and he need not then elect to proceed under Section 378 of the CrPC.

7.9 In this context, we wish to state that the proviso to Section

372 does not make a distinction between an accused who is charged of an offence under the penal law or a person who is deemed to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act. Symmetrical to a victim of an offence, a victim of a deemed offence. under Section 138 of the Act