IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT GWALIOR BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE ON THE 21st OF JANUARY, 2026 MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 2028 of 2016 DEVPRATAP SINGH @ DEEPU TOMAR AND OTHERS Versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Appearance:

Shri Pradeep Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.

Shri Samar Ghuraiya Dy Ga appearing on behalf of Advocate General.

ORDER The present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is directed against the order dated 03.02.2016 passed by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, in Criminal Revision No. 67/2016, whereby, while considering the challenge to the order of framing of charges dated 30.01.2016 passed by the learned Trial Court under Sections 498-A, 494/34 read with Section 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the revision was partly allowed. The petitioners were discharged from the offence under Section 494/34 of the IPC; however, the revision was dismissed insofar as the framing of charges under Sections 498-A and 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was upheld.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while placing reliance on the judgments in Shivcharan Lal Verma and another vs. State of M.P., reported in (2007) 15 SCC 369; P. Sivakumar and others vs. State rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1404–1405 of 2012, decided on 09.02.2023); and Akhilesh Keshari and three others vs. State of U.P. and another (Application under Section 482 No. 38288 of 2023, decided on 28.03.2024), argued that since the very marriage between petitioner No.1 and the complainant was not valid and had taken place during the subsistence of an earlier marriage of petitioner No.1, he cannot be treated as a husband. Therefore, the provisions of Section 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act cannot be said to be attracted. While referring to Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, learned counsel argued that for the subsistence of a valid marriage, neither party to the marriage should have a living spouse at the time of marriage. Meaning thereby, if any spouse is alive, a marriage with another person would not be valid. If parties enter into such a relationship, they cannot be said to be husband and wife, and when the second lady cannot be said to be legally wedded, the provisions of Section 498-A of the IPC would not be attracted, nor would the provisions of Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As the opening words of Section 498-A of the IPC state that “whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished".

3. Learned counsel further referred to Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which defines dowry as property given by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage. Thus, for attracting the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, there should be a valid marriage, which, in the present case, is absent. On the basis of the aforesaid arguments, learned counsel submitted that the charges framed by the Court below under the aforementioned provisions are bad in law. Learned counsel further argued that so far as the framing of charge under Section 506 Part II of the IPC is concerned, there is no allegation of criminal intimidation by the complainant with regard to causing injury to her person, reputation, or property. Therefore, the order framing charge under the aforesaid section is also bad in law. Thus, the matter requires interference by this Court, and the orders passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the Revisional Court deserve to be quashed.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/State submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned Trial Court or the learned Revisional Court in framing charges under Section 498-A of the IPC, Section 506 Part II of the IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It was submitted that petitioner No.2, on a false pretext, got his son, i.e